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I.

INTRODUCTION

To observe that so-called intellectual property (IP)' flowered in the late
twentieth century, even supplanting, to a large extent, the place of real and tangible
personal property in terms of corporate, if not individual, wealth, is almost trite.2
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University; patent attorney admitted to practice before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office in patent cases. A grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund
of the College of Law provided substantial support for this Article of both funding and patience, for
which the author is deeply grateful. The author offers profound thanks to Dana Neac~u who read drafts
when they were unreadable.
1. Because the status of patents and other protected intangibles as property is the issue in this
discussion, the abbreviation "IP" represents the entire phrase, "so-called intellectual property,"
throughout this Article.
2. See Paula M. Rayman & Ann Bookman, Creatinga Research andPublic Policy Agendafor
Work, Family, and Community, 562 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 191, 192 (1999) ("A current

snapshot of our nation would reveal only 3 percent of the workforce employed in agriculture, with the
majority of American workers employed in the service or high-technology sectors of the economy.");
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Since IP has become the bedrock of most commercial wealth, especially in
international trade,3 and since international trade is, or is about to become, the
center of most commercially valuable trade,4 a comprehensive understanding of IP
has become essential. Instead of being the reserve of technicians, the field demands
a full examination by jurists and the larger society.
Although IP literature has blossomed, digesting its fruit is often difficult. This
literature is available in two varieties: broad theoretical treatments so far removed
from doctrine that its consumption seems to do more for the fruit than the palate,
one might say, and narrow discussions of legal doctrine that have value only to the
practitioner, if to anyone. This Article attempts to bridge that gap by showing the
broad political significance of the otherwise narrow doctrine. Part II describes the

inherent but largely unappreciated political nature of intellectual property
judgments. Part III discusses the distinction between inventive and noninventive

advances and challenges the assumption that the dividing line is rigid. Part IV
explains the development of the "nonobviousness" inquiry, its reliance on the
underlying hypothetical practitioner of ordinary skill, and the parallelism between
the patent law inquiry and the vague and often uncertain professional standard and
tort law's reasonable man standard. Part V introduces the concept of the trump of
property, a strategy of defining patents according to property law concepts far

Christopher M. Gacek, U.S. Goals for Patent Protection in the GATT Trade Talks, Heritage
Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG863.cfm (Oct. 31, 1991)
("The past few decades have seen the United States move from an economy propelled by traditional
manufacturing to one in which services and high technology are pre-eminent.").
3. "Intellectual property is this nation's greatest trade asset, returning a balance of trade to the U.S.
economy greater than aircraft and agriculture." Hilary Rosen, Case Is About Creative Rights, USA
TODAY, Feb. 15, 2001, at llA.
The essential feature that is new about the "New Economy" is its increased
dependence on products and services that are the embodiment of ideas.... In
each of these areas, the "product" or "service" is a piece of intellectual
property-for example, a line of computer code, a new connecting device to make
routers and servers more efficient, or new knowledge about genetic profiling that
facilitates the use of gene therapy products to treat disease.
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New
Economy, Remarks at the Antitrust, Technology and Intellectual Property Conference, Berkeley Center
for Law and Technology, University of California, Berkeley (Mar. 2, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf3Ol .htm).
According to a recent study, the products of digital technology-computing
services, telecommunications, and consumer electronic products-now constitute
the largest industry in the United States, ahead of construction, food products, and
automotive manufacturing. In 1996, digital technology businesses generated 6.2
percent of the nation's output of goods and services and employed nearly 4.3
million people. Sales in the field grew in the first six years of the 1990s by 57
percent, to a total value of $866 billion.
Mary L. Azcuenaga, Technological Innovation, International Trade and Competition Policy, Remarks
before the Japan Fair Trade Commission, 50th Anniversary Symposium, Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 1, 1997)
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/japan97.htm).
4. See Alan S. Miller, The Global Environment Facilityand the Searchfor FinancialStrategies
to FosterSustainableDevelopment, 24 VT. L. REv. 1229, 1230 n.9 (2000) ("From 1950 to 1998 world
exports increased 17 times to $5.4 trillion compared with a six-fold increase in global GNP.").
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removed from debates over the public interest in the issuance of patents. Part VI
addresses the complications of the efforts to impose an international patent law
system on countries of widely divergent cultures and values. Part VII concludes
this Article, calling for a more complete understanding of patent law in order to
facilitate more informed decisions in our own country and a critical assessment of
internationalizing this area of law that reflects widely varied and deeply held
political and cultural values around the world.
II.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLITICAL COMPONENTS

The political components of IP demand the most scrutiny. Unlike real
property, IP, by virtue of its defining characteristic of intangibility, tends to defy
casual observation. Tangible qualities typically characterize the ownership of
physical property. Unlike the ownership of a valuable city block, or of an almost
priceless diamond, the indicia of IP ownership remain invisible to specialists and
ordinary citizens alike. More importantly, the political significance of exclusion
from possession and enjoyment of real property is virtually as palpable as the
property itself. Perhaps because of IP's intangibility, the political significance of
exclusion from IP remains concealed and, as a result, frequently misunderstood.
Most important, perhaps, the recognition of real property ownership rights tends to
flow naturally and even intuitively from its real character. Almost no one except
the specialist is even aware of the method of recognizing IP rights or the fact that
such recognition actually creates rights of a truly counterintuitive character.
IP is a device by which the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and courts,
through the conventional language of private property, regulate competition-a
peculiarly public concern. This regulation of competition, the equivalent of a
decision about the distribution of resources, involves an essentially political
judgment regarding competing values: the consideration and resolution of
competitive conditions.5 In other words, IP law, especially patent law, is a kind of
disguised industrial policy. "[An intellectual property system is, in effect, a
passive industrial policy."'6 It is "an industrial policy in today's terms because it
uses legal intervention to decide what technologies to promote.... And it chooses
these technologies.

. .

through a set of prior rules . . . ,"An IP system is simply

an alternative "to a legislative approach [of] industry by industry subsidies or other
market advantages . . . . ' or to "subsidies, licensing, or similar interventionist
policies . . . ."' It is "a form of industrial policy and is therefore concerned with

5. See infra Part IV.
6. Robert M. Sherwood, Human Creativityfor Economic Development: PatentsPropelTechnology,
33 AKRON L. REV.351, 351 (2000). See also Michael H. Davis, Some Realism About Indigenism, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 815, 830 (2003) (discussing whether IP can really protect the cultural
intellectual products of Third World countries).
7. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248
(1994).
8. Id. at 249.
9. Id. at 253.
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R&D activities of firms and industries within the economy .... 10 While others
have recognized that patent law is no more than industrial policy," none have
examined exactly where and how to manage and direct this industrial policy in the
seemingly complex web of patent doctrine. The importance of this issue is not so
much that patent law serves as a form of industrial policy, but that the Federal
Circuit has taken "a narrow technical view ... thereby masking the policy issues
at stake."' 2 The danger is that the approach may "obscure the role of the patent
system in a thicket of technical patent law rules unapproachable by those unskilled
in that arcane art."' 3
Consider briefly how a patent functions as a government-sponsored subsidy.
An innovator 4 must commonly introduce a product or process into the market,
where others will be free to compete, forcing the innovator to lower prices to meet
competition. Until competitors achieve full production and distribution, however,
the innovator will have the opportunity to charge a higher price, and during that
entry period-brief or long, depending upon what technical and economic barriers
may obstruct the entry of others-the innovator can charge more than the ultimately
competitive market price. Alternatively, the innovator can charge the competitive
price during that entry period in order to create customer loyalty-a loyalty which,
depending upon its developed strength, will serve as part of the barrier to entry for
others. Nevertheless, the innovator will have to obtain enough profit to defray the
original costs of research and development. If the competitive market price plus the

10. Id. at 261. The Federal Circuit has noticed the role of the patent system in the allocation of
commercial resources. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1072
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The role of patent systems in the allocation of commercial
resources is of ever-increasing economic importance, as technology dominates the economy.").
11. Commentators frequently recognize, both implicitly and explicitly, that patents are the
equivalent of a subsidy. Lamenting that "direct subsidization is politically unlikely," one writer
observed, "The standard industrial policy mechanisms are direct subsidization and regulatory
relief.... [A] modification of the patent system, rather than regulatory relief in the classic sense of the
term, would best meet the needs of the [biotechnology] industry." Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness and
the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposalfor a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 311, 319 (1997). See generally Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate. From Sears to
Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV. 873 (1971) (discussing the relationship between federal and state monopolies and
the federal constitutional mandate for a competitive economy); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and
Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347
(2000) (suggesting a framework of innovation to help coordinate United States science and technology
policy). See also Dean Baker, The High -Cost of Protectionism: The Case of Intellectual Property
Claims (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 3, 1996, at 11.
12. Dam, supra note 7, at 270.
13. Id. at 271.
14. I use the word "innovator" and "innovation" throughout this Article in its legal, not economic
or "Schumpeterian," sense. See Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the
Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 348 (2000). An innovation, in
patent law, is something that is almost inevitably the latter as well. In other words, it is new technology
and nothing more. To an economist, an innovation is something quite different with, most importantly,
definite commercial advantages. The "Schumpeterian" view does not question the notion of invention
and, perhaps naively, accepts its reality. This Article, to the contrary, examines whether the very notion
of invention is a political construct.
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benefits of the early entry period will not permit recoupment of the original
investment, the incentive will be insufficient to stimulate innovation in the first
place. That rationale lies at the heart of patent law. Patent law is designed to
encourage the innovator by guaranteeing that, even after the entry period, other
competitors will not be able to enter the market. The government, through its
patent regime, bestows upon the prospective innovator the right to charge the
supra-competitive price, otherwise available only during the entry period, for a
period of nearly twenty years. The difference between the supra-competitive patent
price and the competitive market price is the extra source of income that the patent
regime promises to the innovator. The extra income that ultimately comes from the
public is effectively a subsidy that the government provides inventors at public
expense by virtue of the patent regime. Obviously, the government could
accomplish the same result through a direct subsidy by taxing the public generally
and paying the innovator directly (the National Institutes of Health is an example
of such direct subsidization). 5
Those interested in better understanding the nature of IP must discover where
in the patenting process the consideration of public matters is converted into, or
defined as, a purely private matter. In considering the "ownership" or even
existence of IP, the relevant factors are almost invariably public matters, which,
through the language of IP, are made to seem solely the private affairs of
innovators. This conception holds true, paradoxically, even when the inventor is
the government. 6
The nature of the process seems largely different from its practical operation,
because the public competitive judgments are, through a definitional stage,17 treated
as private issues. The process defines competitive conditions and issues as matters
of private property rights. Whether an innovation is patentable depends in large
part upon the amount of the innovator's investment, the funding of the applicable
industry, and the appropriateness of the underlying investments.' The analysis

15. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided over fourteen billion dollars of extramural
funds in 2000. National Institutes of Health, NIH Awards to US Institutions ofHigher Education by
Year
2000,
at
Fiscal
Component and Funding Mechanism,
http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/award/trends/bycompOO.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). One economist
suggests those subsidies are so effective that, if they totally replaced the present pharmaceutical patent
subsidy system, benefits exceeding fifty-six times those of GAT would accrue to the United States
health care system. Baker, supra note 11, at 40.
16. Until about 1980, the government held large numbers of government patents that were available
to all. Passage of the Bayh-Dole Act resulted in treating patents more like private property with the rights
almost automatically going to the contractors who achieved the invention using government funding.

See Peter S. Amo & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable PricingRequirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in
Whole or in Partfrom FederallyFundedResearch, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001).
17. "The definitional stop, so beloved of ordinary language analysts, is frequently used to close
off or obscure the political choices involved in a decision." James Boyle, The Politics of Reason:
CriticalLegalTheory andLocal Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 738 n. 155 (1985). See H.L.A.
Hart, Prolegomenonto the Principlesof Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 15, 18 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1988).
18. See infra Part IV.
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determines whether the advance is the product of an inventor as opposed to a mere

plodder. 9 The direct consequence is a conclusion about whether the innovation is
the inventor's property or is a mere pedestrian advance freely available as part of
the public domain. The implications of such a misplaced definition are highly
significant. At least two serious, potentially undesirable, and even socially
dangerous consequences result. Domestically, the unexamined grant of monopoly
rights to private concerns within a supposedly free enterprise regime can create
unjust social and political effects. Internationally, the demand for, and possibly
imposition of, exclusive trading rights, especially by nationals of wealthy nations
over those of undeveloped ones, may find overly simple and unfair justifications
in unexamined claims of supposed property rights.
The following sections of this Article attempt to demonstrate that the core
concept of American patent law (and, indeed, of "international" patent law) 2 -- the
definition of invention-is nothing more than a disguised judgment of public
competitive interests masquerading as an objective measure of technological
features. This definition is the so-called "nonobviousness inquiry," written into the
1952 Patent Act2 as an attempt to broaden the definition of when an invention
occurs and, thus, when a patent monopoly is available.22
Before proceeding, however, understanding the significance of this point is
crucial. Determining that something is inventive decides not only that it merits a
patent but also that it is the sort of advance that innovators would not have made
without the promise of a profitable monopoly.23 If the distinction between the
inventive and the pedestrian were a factual, technical one, the definition of an

invention might not incorporate political or policy judgments. Because, as
subsequent portions of this Article illustrate, the distinction lies along a continuum

19. See Lawrence B. Ebert, You Can 't Know When You Can't See It, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, April
2001, at 22.
20. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1208 n.27 (1994) ("For the
purposes of this Article ... 'inventive step' ... may be deemed ... synonymous with .
'nonobvious'....") [hereinafter TRIPS].
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
22. Other scholars have noted inherent problems with the nonobviousness requirement. See, e.g.,
Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel andNonobvious
Reconceptualizationofthe Biotechnology Patent,55 STAN. L. REv.303, 361 (2002) ("[T]he section 101
'invention or discovery' requirement seems to overlap with the section 103 nonobviousness requirement
because the creation of something 'obvious' could not require much invention.").
23. This rationale, of course, is the basis for the patent regime. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond
Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1097, 1125-26
(1989) [hereinafter Oddi (Obviousness)]. This calculus-separating those advances that innovators
would only make because of the promise of the patent from those that ordinary practitioners would
make in the normal course of events-is what the nonobviousness inquiry purportedly accomplishes.
However, some doubt the proposition. "Patent statutes do not distinguish, and appear incapable of
distinguishing, those inventions that are patent induced from those that are nonpatent induced." A.
Samuel Oddi, The InternationalPatent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987
DuKE L.J. 831, 839 [hereinafter Oddi (IPS)].
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without any principled loci, identifying those advances which are factually
inventive without reference to some other non-factual policy preference is
impossible. In another sense, no category of innovations can exist that does not
depend, for classification as an invention, upon the added incentive of the patent
monopoly. Because, in the opinion of many scientists and judges, invention is
inevitable, the factual basis, although not the economic impact, of the patent
calculus is fallacious and its result reflects political rather than technological
judgments.
A.

Are Inventions Inevitable?24

Although patent law claims to separate those advances that innovators would
not have made without additional special skill from those that proprietors would
have made in any event by rewarding only those distinctive "inventors," most
commentators agree that patent law can only identify those advances innovators
would not have made quite as quickly. Much evidence indicates that inventions
proceed apace, irrespective of legal rules.25 Other evidence indicates that,
26
regardless of the incentives, many inventions will not arise until the time is right.
Still other evidence indicates that technological progress is related more to the
technological development and economic infrastructure of a given country than to
any particular patent regimes. Consequently, advanced countries make more
inventions than less-developed ones, even if the latter have more "advanced" patent

24. This title is taken from William F. Ogbum & Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? A
Note on Social Evolution, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 83 (1922), in which the authors list 148 inventions that two
or more persons made almost simultaneously. They conclude "that the evidence presented of
independent duplicate origins of inventions brings out forcibly the importance of the cultural factor in
the production of inventions." Id. at 92. One might conclude that patent law is among the cultural
factors involved, but Ogburn and Thomas expressly excluded patent law. They attributed the velocity
of innovation to "the elements of the materialculture at any one time." Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
Consequently,
electrical appliances could not have been invented in, let us say, the fifteenth
century, because the fundamental discoveries regarding electricity had not been
made. A certain cultural preparation was quite necessary for the invention of the
telegraph. The fact that so many electrical inventions followed so
quickly... suggests the inevitability of these inventions.
Id. at 88.
25. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). See also National Wire Bound Box
Co. v. Healy, 189 F. 49 (7th Cir. 1911) for this proposition:
An invention is not something that, but for the particular inventor or inventors,
would not have been. Inventions come along as the discovery of gas deposits
come[s] along-the contribution of some particular person to the world's
knowledge-but if not by that person, then, in the course of time, and usually in
a very short time, by some one else.
Id. at 55. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
26. British science historian James Burke has explored this idea elegantly by tracing the
interdependent relationships between diverse technological advances. See infra notes 33 & 37.
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regimes.27 As Jefferson wrote, "it may be observed that the nations which refuse
monopolies of invention, are as fruitful as England in new and useful devices."28
Even the Supreme Court has observed that patent laws, at best, only encourage
earlier invention: "Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine
whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want
of incentives, but that is all."29 In other words, patent law simply acts as an
accelerator upon particular parts of our technological economy.
III. THE FINE LINE BETWEEN INVENTIVE AND NONINVENTIVE

The next section on nonobviousness discusses the legal rules and problems
associated with the decision to categorize a technological advance as nonobvious.
First, an overview is necessary to place nonobviousness in its proper context. The

27. Consider the following:

The U.S. position in the international fight over intellectual property rights is
based on the proposition that the additional innovation induced by stronger patent
systems is so substantial that the net social impact of a strengthening of
intellectual property rights abroad will be positive. These propositions are
empirically testable, yet the empirical evidence underlining these propositions
ranges from sketchy to nonexistent.... We show that the 1988 patent reforms in
Japan expanded the scope of patent protection ....
Empirically analyzing data
on 307 Japanese firms during the period 1980 to 1994, we find little evidence that
this expansion of patent scope induced additional R&D effort by Japanese firmns.
MARIKO SAKAKIBARA & LEE BRANSTETTER, Do STRONGER PATENTS INDUCE MORE INNOVATION?
EVIDENCE FROM THE 1998 JAPANESE PATENT LAW REFORMS 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7066, 1999). Unsurprisingly, while Sakakibara and Branstetter found little
additional innovation, they did find, as a result of patent reforms, an increase in patenting in the sense
that the number of patent claims (although not the rate of application filings) accelerated after the patent
law changed to facilitate such an increase. Id. at 27. Though seemingly paradoxical, sometimes a
negative correlation appears between IP and innovation. JAMES E. BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN,
SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Department of Economics,
Working Paper No. 00-01, Jan. 2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=206189. Oddi lists seven articles concluding that
patents are disadvantageous for developing countries and another four asserting the opposite. Oddi
(IPS), supra note 23, at 832 n.4.
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854). An important fact that colored Jefferson's
views was that most patents, in that time, were of the "importation" variety, not requiring invention at
all.
29. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 317. The Chakrabarycourt voiced doubt about patentability as a
necessary precursor to innovation:
The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to
genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has
already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection
would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will
not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than
Canute could command the tides.
Id. Two MIT researchers, echoing this sentiment, recently noted the astonishingly great innovation that
occurred in the computer software industry not after, but before the assurance of IFPprotection. See
BESSEN & MASKIN, supra note 27.
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nonobviousness inquiry examines the entire universe of technological advances in
a particular industry or art-from the mundane to the amazing, from the simple to
the complex, from the gerry-rigged to the elegant-and separates them into two
categories: the ordinary and the inventive. Nonobviousness implies that inventive
advances are distinctly different from all others.3" This claim is important, of
course, because absent essential differences, the decision to grant a patent would
have to rest on explicitly more political and debatable reasons. For instance, if one
recognizes that all technological advances are essentially the same, effectively
prosaic and banal, the decision to subsidize one and not the other would have to be
based on reasons relevant to the subsidy itself, perhaps that a certain industrial
sector deserved added economic support.
The line between the inventive and the noninventive is promoted as a rigid
one.3 A line admittedly unsecured and free-floating, with a location shifting at
30. The patent bar and other pro-patent interests, since successfully having it written into the 1952
Act, often emphasize that the inquiry measures the invention, not the inventor. "Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). "[Ilt is the
invention as a whole that must be considered in obviousness determinations. The invention as a whole
embraces the structure, its properties, and the problem it solves." In re Wright, 848 F.2d 1216, 1219
(Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Lucas Aerospace Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 899 F. Supp. 1268, 1289 (D.
Del. 1995) (requiring factual inquiries in the nonobviousness test). "Our interest is in the child, not in
how or where it was born or who were its parents." Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel
Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 1943). "This verbal test seemed to indicate that the actual
manner by which the inventor conceived and produced the invention was of importance. However, the
decisions adopted the contrary view that it is the result alone that is evaluated .... " 2 DONALD S.
CHISUM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 5.04[2] (Supp.
2003).
31. "[O]ne of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness .... " United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962). The contention that inventive advances are distinctively different

from all other innovations rests at the very core of some of the most hotly disputed issues in patent law.
The language courts use sometimes seems inappropriately charged. Some view patent law as a matter
of human, not property, rights. "The right to exclude others is the essence of the human right called
'property.' The right to exclude others from free use of an invention protected by a valid patent does
not differ from the right to exclude others from free use of one's automobile, crops, or other items of
personal property." Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th Cir.
1978). At times, ordinary patent infringement is characterized as theft. In order "to 'prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention,' "the doctrine of equivalents must... remain within
the boundaries established by the prior art, the scope of the patent claims themselves, and any
surrendered subject matter." K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See
also Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (holding infringement still possible under doctrine of equivalents even when no literal
infringement present); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(testing infringement using the doctrine of equivalents in addition to literal infringement tests). At other
times, infringement constitutes fraud. "The purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent a form
of fraud, as the Supreme Court called it in Graver Tank. Its purpose is to protect inventors from those
who would take the invention and by insubstantial change avoid the letter of the claims." Vehicular
Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Fraud is a strong word,
especially in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, where one might just as easily characterize the
overbroad demands of a patent proprietor as a fraud upon the public.
[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents,
coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal
claims. The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent.., not
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will, would be subject to the fatal criticism that it is arbitrary and, worse, political.
After all, the result of patent protection is the transfer of public (consumer)
resources to private (industrial) parties. Such a tax would be intolerable without
full political debate unless characterized as a property right attaching to some
inherent technological qualities rather than the equivalent of a selective tax
effectively redistributing wealth.
However, the notions that all technological advances are essentially the same
and that the line is completely arbitrary are neither new nor especially startling to
specialists. The Patent Act itself admits as much through its choice of an objective
test for invention.3 2 More important, the scientific literature, unconcerned with the
niceties of patent law, has found unnecessary a departure from the simple truth that
the inventive and banal do not share the same continuum, but instead, share the
same unimaginative location. As James Burke observes,
[H]istory is not, as we are so often led to believe, a matter of great
men and lonely geniuses pointing the way to the future from their
ivory towers. At some point every member of society is involved
in the process by which innovation and change comes about,
and.., given average intelligence and the information available
to the innovators of the past, any reader could have matched their
achievements.33
The author later states:
In the heroic treatment, historical change is shown to have
been generated by the genius of individuals, conveniently labelled
'inventors'. In such a treatment, Edison invented the electric
light, Bell the telephone, Gutenberg the printing press, Watt the
steam engine, and so on. But no individual is responsible for
producing an invention ex nihilo. The elevation of the single
inventor to the position of sole creator at best exaggerates his
influence over events ....

to give a patentee something which he could not lawfully have obtained from the
PTO had he tried. Thus, since prior art always limits what an inventor could have
claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal
citations omitted).
32. The Act, as amended to exclude the Supreme Court's requirement of a "flash of creative genius,"
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941), excluded, at the same time, the
possibility of inherently distinguishing some advances. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Not coincidentally, this
development mirrors much earlier changes in negligence law where an objective measure of "fault"
substituted for a subjective one. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Comm. P1.
1837).
33. JAMES BuRKE, CONNEcTIoNs 13 (1978).

34. Id. at 288.
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Stressing his point one final time, Burke reminds his readers that "no inventor
works alone. The myth of the lonely genius, filled with vision and driven to
exhaustion by his dream, may have been deliberately fostered by Edison, but even
he did not invent
the light bulb without help from his colleagues and
35
predecessors.
Granting the patent monopoly through the nonobviousness inquiry, when
inventions are inevitable,36 seems a rather awkward way of separating out those
advances requiring or meriting greater financial awards from other
indistinguishably different ones. The awkwardness grows upon consideration that
offering incentives to selective indistinguishably different advances is, at best, a
very chancy way of furthering technological progress. We can have very little faith
that one invention will necessarily lead to other particularly desirable ones, because
we really do not know how innovations which are more useful, as opposed to less
useful, are achieved.

7

In short, the vast majority of, and probably all, inventions are composed of
known elements, of which the novel arrangement, application, or utility constitutes
the invention. "Virtually all inventions are necessarily combinations of old
elements. ''38 That being true, the patentability of any one invention turns solely on

35. Id. at 291.
36. See Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 24. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317
(1980) (doubting the need for patentability as a necessary precursor to innovation).
37. Burke's book incontestably makes this point by claiming that a linear historical view of
technological progress is the most comfortable. However, the path of progress that benefits mankind
is much less linear, much less intelligible or coherent, and almost entirely unpredictable and inscrutable.
"The triggering factor is more often than not operating in an area entirely unconnected with the situation
which is about to undergo change." BURKE, supra note 33, at 289. Consider, as one example, the
chimney:
A linear view of the past would, for instance, place the arrival of the chimney in
a sequence of developments relating to change in domestic living. Yet the
alteration of life-style brought about by the chimney included year-round
administration and increased intellectual activity, which in turn contributed to a
general increase in the economic welfare of the community to a point where the
increase in the construction of houses brought about a shortage of wood. The
consequent need for alternative sources of energy spurred the development of a
furnace which would operate efficiently on coal, and this led to the production of
molten iron in large quantities, permitting the casting of the cylinders which were
used in the early steam engines.
Id. at 289. If wishing to increase industrial motive power, who would think first of encouraging
domestic comfort? The PTO? The huge proportion of patents never commercialized at least partly
illustrates the unpredictability of research and development. "In reality, the majority of patents are not
commercialized." Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the
Fountainhead?,49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 518 (1999). See Daniel N. Christus, A. Jos6 Cortina,
Robert E. Wagner & John T. Winburn, IntellectualProperty in the Americas, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1095, 1098 (1998).
38. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Envtl.
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("That all elements of an invention
may have been old (the normal situation), or some old and some new, or all new, is however, simply
irrelevant. Virtually all inventions are combinations and virtually all are combinations of old
elements."); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
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the degree of innovation of that particular combination, a judgment not made with
reference to the technical nature of the invention, but solely, and as required by
statute, with reference to the prevailing social and economic conditions at the time
of the invention." This framework is the nonobviousness inquiry.
IV. NONOBVIOUSNESS
A. The ApparentNeed to Identify Exceptional,or Noninevitable,Innovations
Inventions may be inevitable, but the patent system proceeds from a different
premise-that absent the patent monopoly, innovators will either not make the
inventions at all or will make them at later dates. This idea conflicts, of course,
with the apparent fact that once the conditions are right, inventions result, often in
more than one place at a time.4" In fact, evidence indicates that the patent
monopoly actually slows the pace of invention, at least in some industries.4

("[V]irtually every claimed invention is a combination of old elements ....");David E. Wigley,
Evolution of the Concept of Non-Obviousness of the Novel Invention: From a Flash of Genius to the
Trilogy, 42 ARIz. L. REv. 581, 598 (2000) ("[M]ost, if not all, inventions are to some extent innovative
combinations of known elements.").
39. One of the many practical problems with transforming the inherently regulatory and therefore
ambiguous legal abstraction of nonobviousness into actual administrative decisions granting or denying
patents is that the PTO feels equally ambiguous about the rules under which its examiners must make
these decisions. Constraining the examiners requires that they find, in prior patent applications, each
and every element of the new combination, and further, that they find a "teaching" in those prior
applications that indicates the appropriateness of a combination. Then, to free examiners from this
artificially narrow constraint, a constraint not present in the statute, the PTO allows examiners to find
both the teaching and even some elements of the combination in "knowledge generally available," not
necessarily requiring a specific prior art reference. Finally, to constrain the freedom such a rule invites,
the PTO requires that the general availability of such knowledge be either "capable of instant and
unquestionable demonstration" or "notorious." PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF
2142, at 2100-97; 2143, at 2100-97;
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT ExAMINING PROCEDURE,
2143.01, at 2100-98; 2144, at 2100-101; 2144.03, at 2100-102-2100-103 (7th ed., rev. 2000)
[hereinafter MPEP].
40. See supra Part 1.A.
41. See BESSEN & MASKIN, supra note 27. See also Teresa M. Summers, The Scope of Utility in
the Twenty-First Century: New Guidancefor Gene-RelatedPatents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 476 (2003):
[B]road patents covering basic research in today's biotech industry are
inappropriate. They are inappropriate because the development of today's patent
law does not account for two trends in modem biotechnology. First, biotech
research rapidly unlocks science at an increasingly rudimentary level.
Meanwhile, patent law has become much broader, threatening to impede progress
by taking fundamental building blocks of science out of the public domain.
Second, recent legislation, enacted to foster a merger between, traditionally
distinct public and private sector researchers, encourages discoverers of
rudimentary upstream research tools to patent their product and license it to
downstream commercial innovators.
Dean Baker estimates expanding existing direct federal subsidies to substitute for the present patent
subsidies of pharmaceutical research would yield fifty-six times the efficiencies that internationalizing
GATT standards has accomplished. Baker, supra note 11, at 45. "A standard for equivalence of code
elements that ignores these factors risks stifling legitimate efforts to design around existing software
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Nevertheless, the patent regime relies on an untested (and perhaps untestable) faith
that its existence correlates singularly and positively with the pace of innovation.42
The patent monopoly-the exclusive control of the right to make, use, sell, or even
offer to sell, new products or processes 43 -is therefore only available with respect
to some products or processes. The monopoly is, in that sense, exceptional (the
monopoly is also exceptional in the theoretical sense, because in a so-called free
market economy, the patent monopoly must be the exception to an otherwise freely
competitive market). Its relatively occasional appearance makes it no less a
monopoly. In fact, the infrequency should, but does not often seem to, raise serious
questions about its uneven distribution. A reference to intuitive property and
technological terminologyjustifies the relative infrequency of the granting of patent
rights. The goods or processes must be "inventive" to justify patent protection.
This reference to common parlance, the notion of an "invention," tends to shield the
special nature of patent protection from any or much special inquiry. After all,
common sense suggests that an invention is special enough to merit special
treatment. In fact, this section is devoted to that area of patent law which attempts
to distinguish those innovations that merit the patent monopoly from those that do
not. We will see, however, that hardly anything "special" warrants the resulting

monopoly. Rather, something far closer to "arbitrary" or, at best, "policy," (or raw
politics) determines what qualifies.
First, patent law does not attempt to find something special, in the subjective
sense, to justify awarding the patent monopoly." Sixty years ago, in Cuno

patents." Julie E. Cohen,& Mark A. Lemley, PatentScope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001). "It is uncertain whether this large breadth of coverage is required to facilitate
the original innovation, or whether it places an undue burden on future research and development by
blocking off too much ground." Paul M. Janicke, When Patents Are Broadened Midstream: A
Compromise Solultion to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (1997).
"[T]he first patent holder in line has the power to hold up the entire downstream chain of research.
Clarisa Long, ProprietaryRights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823, 833 (2000).
This power to block improvements places the first patent holder in a superior bargaining position.
Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 79-81 (1994).
42. The experience of the developing world largely undercuts this assumption. See Oddi (IPS),
supra note 23.
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
44. Although the text describes the patent system in its textual sense, this description is wrong,
at least partially, in another sense. As James Boyle has observed, beneath the patent system lies a
committed belief in the romantic inventorship doctrine, which allows patent law to draw the publicprivate line in a confident manner. James Boyle, A Theory ofLaw andInformation: Copyright,Spleens,
Blackmail,and InsiderTrading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1418-19 (1992). By subscribing, sotto voce,
to the romantic inventorship doctrine, patent law can accept inventors' claims to monopoly and reject
the public interest by favoring the aggressive, risk-taking inventor over the passive, job-inspired public.
Using such images, the patent system awards all rights to the inventor, even if the inventor simply
rearranged elements already belonging to the public. The law, attached to the romantic vision of the
inventor, assumes but does not require proof that a rearrangement is worthy. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that the inventor is incidental to the patent system, the goal
of which is not the inventor's fortuitous monopoly but the invention's contributed progress to the public
domain. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary
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Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,4 the Supreme Court, in what

intuitively seems an exercise of common sense, insisted that to be patentable,
inventions had to demonstrate "the flash of creative genius."4 In 1952, Congress
statutorily rejected the Court's decision and added the current patent law
requirement of "nonobviousness"-the so-called "ordinary practitioner" test. To
make it clear that simple trial and error is more than adequate and that any notion
of "genius" is unnecessary surplus, Congress added the last sentence of section
103(a), which reads: "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made."'47 What is required, in other words, is that the inventor be
just a bit more than a "plodder." 8 Interestingly, in this way the Patent Act validates
the very "sweat" theory that the Supreme Court banished from copyright law in

Feist.4" While the notion of an invention and certainly that of a "flash of creative
genius" imply something inherently special about an innovation, the new 1952
requirement of nonobviousness was simply a traditional balancing test. As one
observer put it, "It would therefore appear that the central issues
concerning... inventions and discoveries.., are more a question of fundamental

objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."') (alteration in original) (citation omitted); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration."); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,320 (1948) ("But however
that may be, the Constitution places the rewards to inventors in a secondary role. It makes the public
interest the primary concern in the patent system."); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) ("[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent
laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is 'to promote the progress of
science and useful arts .... ') (citation omitted); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28
(1858) ("It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never
designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was
another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly."); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 11, 18 (1829) ("While one great object was, by holding out a reasonable
reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to
stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to promote the progress of science and useful
arts .... ') (citation omitted).
45. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
46. Id. at 91. Saying some might characterize Cuno, which was reversed statutorily less than a
decade later, as an exercise in common sense is not just academic obstinacy. While citations to the case
usually refer only to its famous phrase, the sentence containing the phrase and the sentence following
seem to show genius of another sort as well. Justice Douglas saw, as Jefferson had a century and a half
earlier, that patent law was basically an economic embarrassment, representing an intrusion upon public
rights. A heavily lobbied Congress overlooked this mastery of patent basics and instead substituted the
nonobviousness inquiry for the considered judgment of Douglas at the height of his jurisprudential
powers: "That is to say, the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative
genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on
the public domain." Id.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
48. Ebert, supra note 19, at 22. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
49. FeistPubl'ns, 499 U.S. at 352. This line of thought does not necessarily render section 103(a)
constitutionality suspect, and the Supreme Court is quite unlikely to ever upset established industry
interests by so holding. However, this anomaly does illustrate the powerful economic, as opposed to
theoretical, foundations of patent law.
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policy than the essence of things."5 Thus, the earmark of an "invention" is not that
something special inheres in its nature, but that, all things considered, the innovator
(or more commonly the innovator's employer) merits monopoly profits.
B. Section 103 and the Nonobviousness Test
Patent law attempts to distinguish between the inevitable (the unpatentable)
innovation and the exceptional (the patentable) innovation through section 103,
which requires that, to be patentable, the purportedly inventive aspects of any
innovation have to be nonobvious to a practitioner of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art.
A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.5'
Importantly, the measurement of nonobviousness is to be performed as of the
date of the invention. The timing of this measurement requires, by definition, a
legal fiction: from the vantage point of many years later, the statute requires the
answer to a question based on the facts and circumstances at the time of the
invention, when no one asked or attempted to answer the question. Thus at the
outset, as one author has observed, this very concept of nonobviousness embraces
an economic as well as a technological dimension. "Thus, although it might be
conceded that an invention is 'obvious' in the sense that it is technicallypossible,
relatively, nonobvious because a rational
an invention may be economically, 5or
S2
economic actor would not pursue it."
Although the Federal Circuit insists that this inquiry 3 (that of what would have
been obvious to the ordinary practitioner) "is a question of law based on underlying

50. Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret ofLife: Biotechnology and PropertyRights Revisited, 32
McGEORGE L. REv. 111, 137 (2000). While Yelpaala addressed biotechnological innovations, the
observation surely applies to other areas of patentability. In the biotechnology context, an awareness
of "annexing and patenting the common heritage of mankind, and, more recently, mankind itself' is
only sensible. Yvonne Cripps, PatentingResources: Biotechnology and the Concept of Sustainable
Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 119, 133 (2001).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
52. Boyd, supra note 11, at 337-38. Although the author made this statement to support an
explicit change in the nonobviousness standard, she also recognized that the present test can easily

accommodate this kind of nonobviousness, saying, "economic nonobviousness is not inconsistent with
the current doctrine of nonobviousness." Id. at 340. Although she proposed the change because she
thought decisions applying an economic test were illegitimate and a "subterfuge," id. at 339, this Article
argues that the use of a reasonable person or ordinary practitioner test to accommodate a possibly
infinite number of values is hardly illegitimate. Instead, it is the nature of any objective test and is the
reason behind the current version of the statutory test.
53. The inquiry in question is that of the appropriate level of skill pursuant to § 103 and the John
Deere test. See infra Part IV.C.
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findings of fact, 54 the Supreme Court has found the Federal Circuit less than
persuasive on this issue, questioning "the degree to which the obviousness
determination is one of fact."55 Indeed, value judgments inevitably fashion the
ingredients that contribute to the determination. First, the ordinary practitioner is
not any one individual practitioner, so that no matter how many witnesses may
testify, a court is not bound by the testimony of any particular witness or number
of witnesses regarding their potential knowledge or actions.56 Second, when the test
is, as is usually the case, whether a practitioner would have thought of combining
known features, or "references," such thinking is almost never within the domain
of testimony itself, because references can be combined either when they
themselves contain a suggestion of combination or, on a much more open-ended
level, when knowledge generally available to the practitioner would have so
suggested." We always know that at least one person-the inventor-did
understand this suggestion, but his individual decision is not part of the test We
also know the rest of the industry, whether understanding the suggestion or not, did
not act on it,"s so that the PTO or a court effectively has carte blanche to go either
way.
A staple of patent law is that near-simultaneous invention by two or more
different inventors does not contradict nonobviousness.59 However, if others reach

54. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986). But cf In re Watts, 354 F.3d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Obviousness 'is a legal conclusion based on underlying findings of
fact."') (citation omitted); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("Claim construction is a question of law that this court reviews without
deference ....

Infringement ...

is a question of fact ....

Obviousness is a question of law ....

")

(internal citations omitted); Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on underlying findings of fact.").
56. SeeIn re Metz, No. 97-1263, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23733 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998). Courts
routinely reject evidence of what the actual inventor would have done or thought. "The only inquiry
is whether... relevant prior art, would have rendered the claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art; this inquiry, as a matter of law, is independent of the motivations that led the inventors
to the claimed invention." Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000). See also Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (inquiring into whether the PTO
had substantial evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation
of producing the claimed invention). Similarly, the testimony of other actual (as opposed to
hypothetical) practitioners is notoriously subject to challenge. See, for instance, Ruiz v. A.B. Chance
Co., 234 F.3d 654, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in which the witness asserted the invention was obvious but
admitted that he had more than ordinary skill because he had worked in the field for several decades.
57. In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 351 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See infra note 60.
58. This premise assumes no interference (contesting claims by more than one inventor to the
same invention) but raises the dilemma of what to do when the evidence is uncontested that two or more
parties developed the same innovation around the same time. Seemingly, the invention was not
nonobvious, but the PTO resolution treats each as an inventor, the kind of "special" person whose status
is beyond that of the ordinary practitioner and thus irrelevant to the inquiry.
59. The Federal Circuit uncomfortably recognizes the relevance of simultaneous invention. "The
fact of near-simultaneous invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is strong
evidence of what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the art." Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Int'l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 405
(Ct. Cl. 1969)). Tempering that recognition is an equal and opposite desire to give effect to the nation's
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the same conclusion within a short amount of time, the industry could easily render
the invention obvious, at least in some relative sense. When a near-simultaneous
invention occurs, patent law recognizes both parties as inventors. The prize goes
to the first, under this country's first-to-invent system,60 even though this rule is
partly inconsistent with the emphasis, since the 1952 Act, on measuring inventions
in terms of the invention and not the inventor.
In determining whether an invention is obvious, the PTO follows a highly
mechanical route. No matter how obvious in fact a technical innovation may seem
to a lay observer, the PTO will not rule the invention obvious absent the appearance
of "references" (almost invariably in previously granted patents) that contain the
steps or physical components whose combination in the subject invention the PTO
may deem obvious. Even if all the steps or components are found in these
published references, though, the combination of such steps or components does not
normally constitute an obvious one unless the publications contain some kind of
explicit suggestion to combine them. Such an explicit suggestion is necessary,
because the PTO (but not necessarily a reviewing court) requires "'a showing of the
teaching or motivation to combine prior art references.' That suggestion may come
from, inter alia,the teachings of the references themselves and, in some cases, from
the nature of the problem to be solved."'"

first-to-invent system, which seems to presume multiple inventorship. "Because the statute, 35 U.S.C.
§ 135 (establishing and governing interference practice), recognizes the possibility of near simultaneous
invention by two or more equally talented inventors working independently, that occurrence may or
may not be an indication of obviousness when considered in light of all the circumstances." Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik Gmbh v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Courts,
therefore, seemingly tilt towards finding simultaneous invention instead of obviousness. "The virtually
simultaneous making of the same invention does not in itself preclude patentability of that invention."
Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Prior to the Federal
Circuit, simultaneous invention seemed to be more of a full-fledged secondary test of obviousness.
Reeves Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 417 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1969). For further discussions
regarding the relationship between simultaneous invention and nonobviousness, see E.. du Pont
Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247, 1265 & n.29 (8th Cir. 1980) and Jennifer Chung,
Comment,Does SimultaneousResearch Make an Invention Obvious? The 35 US.C.§ 103 Nonobvious
Requirementfor Patents as Applied to the Simultaneous Research Problem, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
337 (2001).
60. The very existence of the interference procedures is somewhat at odds with obviousness.
The statute establishing interferences in the PTO, 35 U.S.C. § 135, is entirely
premised on the concept that the same nonobvious invention may be
contemporaneously made by a plurality of inventors. That congressional mandate,
and the priority status given in interferences to the first-to-file a patent application,
accord with the Constitutional purpose of the patent system, i.e., to encourage
public disclosure of inventions in this country.
E. I. du Pont Nemours, 620 F.2d at 1265 n.29.
61. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). See Ecolochem, 227
F.3d at 1376 (finding obviousness depends on a combination of prior art references, with some teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine the references); Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357
F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the Ecolochem requirement demanding evidence of a
motivation to combine the prior art references); Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Coopervision, Inc., 207 F. Supp.
2d 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying the Ecolochem combination requirement); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,
357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a showing of some suggestion or motivation to
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Although the Federal Circuit has held that "[t]he presence or absence of a
motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure
question of fact," 62 courts wrestle with the question of what would motivate the

researcher of ordinary skill to search for and combine previous knowledge or
references. This question is especially difficult to answer when, as the Federal
Circuit has suggested, innovators can obtain the motivation to combine "from the

ordinary knowledge of those skilled in the art ...

.,63

Another Federal Circuit

holding, that the "nature of the problem '" can supply sufficient motivation, simply
restates the question.
C. The Negligence Parallel

In Graham v. John Deere Co.,65 the Supreme Court first addressed section
103's test of nonobviousness and noted its parallel with ordinary negligence.66
Expressly created to displace the subjective Cuno test of "creative genius,"67 the
statutory test is an objective one, asking whether the ordinarily skilled practitioner"
could have developed the invention. Although a more finely honed version, the test
closely resembles the traditional tort law standard of the reasonable person,69 clearly
not being any particular practitioner nor all practitioners.7 ° The standard is thus
undeniably fictional:

combine prior to the actual invention).
62. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316. Indeed, the Court has elsewhere been rather candid about
the decisive effects of such a doctrine. "The burden on the party asserting obviousness is more easily
carried when the references on which the assertion is based were not directly considered by the
examiner during prosecution." WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1999). In other words, the PTO decision of nonobviousness is not easily subject to review.
63. Id.
64. In re Gartside,203 F.3d at 1320.
65. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
66.
The Court noted that any difficulties applying the test were "comparable to
those.., in... negligence .. " Id. at 18.
67. See infra note 126.
68. In a fashion typical of negligence law, the test specifically excludes factors relating to the
inventor's mental state. "The educational level of the inventor is specifically not to be considered."
Wigley, supranote 38, at 598. See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("[S]ection 103 is not concerned with the actual skill of the inventors-whose skill may be
extraordinary-but rather with the level of ordinary skill in the art .... ").
69. This tailored version of the reasonable person originated both statutorily and judicially. "In
making the determination of obviousness, the standard ofjudgment is not what would be obvious to a
layman, 'but rather what would be obvious to one "reasonably skilled in the applicable art."' This has
been called 'a specialized reasonable man test for obviousness."' Nicofibers, Inc. v. Reichhold Chems.,
Inc., 505 F. Supp. 496, 507 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (citations omitted). See also Rockwell Int'l Corp. v.
United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (connecting the standard of obviousness to "one
skilled in the art"); Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (applying the "obviousness standard" to "one skilled in the dialysis art"). "The statute itself sets
out what may be considered a specialized reasonable man test for obviousness ....
Formal Fashions,
Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Wesley Jessen Corp. v.
Coopervision, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying Rockwell's standard).
70. In re Metz, No. 97-1263, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23733 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998).
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[T]he test is not whether a particular individual, or two
individuals as in this case, of ordinary skill in the art could or did
make the connection, but rather if it would have been obvious to
the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. The
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art represents an
ideal.7
The courts construct a hypothetical practitioner, just like tort law's reasonable
person, with all the requisite warnings against hindsight, using, of course,
hindsight.72 Indeed, the Federal Circuit, effectively this nation's patent court, has
drawn the parallel to negligence with great force:
With the involved facts determined, the decisionmaker
confronts a ghost, i.e., "a person having ordinary skill in the art,"
not unlike the "reasonable man" and other ghosts in the law. To
reach a proper conclusion under § 103, the decisionmaker must
step backward in time and into the shoes worn by that "person"
when the invention was unknown and just before it was made. In
light of all the evidence, the decisionmaker must then determine
whether the patent challenger has convincingly
established... that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious at that time to that person. The answer to that
question partakes more of the nature of law than of fact, for it is
an ultimate conclusion based on a foundation formed of all the
probative facts. If itself a fact, it would be part of its own
foundation.73
Just how comprehensively the Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,7
intended its analogy to negligence is impossible to know:
What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be
uniformity of thought in every given factual context. The
difficulties, however, are comparable to those encountered daily
by the courts in such frames of reference as negligence and
scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case development.

71. Id. at *12.
72. As patent courts routinely counsel against hindsight, see infra note 79, negligence courts,
unsurprisingly, do the same. See Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679 N.E.2d 616, 620 (N.Y. 1997); Bily v.
Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992); Tarassoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d
334, 345 (Cal. 1976); People v. Traughber, 439 N.W.2d 231, 237 (Miss. 1989); Transp. Ins. Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 20 (Tex. 1994). See also Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Perspectiveon Legal Responses to Medical Error,24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 39 (2003) ("[I]n a very patent
way, the tort system is ineradicably infected with 'hindsight bias."').
73. Panduit Corp. v. Denison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (1987) (citations omitted).
74. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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We believe that strict observance of the requirements laid down
here will result in that uniformity and definiteness which
Congress called for in the 1952 Act.75
This statement is telling because, like nonobviousness, negligence is substantially
a concealed technique by which to implement unstated political preferences. Most
courts and commentators agree that negligence law is'a vehicle for making
concealed choices among competing political values.76 Thus, just as negligence
varies according to the circumstances, so does nonobviousness, as John Deere
suggests. However, the John Deere Court's sanguine confidence that case-by-case
development would achieve uniformity is, at best, naive.77 One of the few things
on which legal historians seem to agree is that the development of the objective,
reasonable person standard of care served to promote obvious economic interests
by effectively subsidizing the industrial revolution (certainly a national industrial
policy if ever one existed). 7' Essential to understand is that the nature of an
objective test inherently gives license to courts to roam freely from the facts of a
75. Id. at 18.
76. See, for instance, the treatment historians give to Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292
(1850). "In their current portrayal of nineteenth-century law, torts scholars have used the rejection of
Rylands, along with cases from Brown v. Kendall to Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, to demonstrate how
American courts consistently subsidized technology and industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries." Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgatesof Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs
and the Adoption ofFletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 377 (2000). See Joseph
H. King, Jr., A Goals-OrientedApproach to Strict Tort Liabilityfor Abnormally DangerousActivities,
48 BAYLORL. REv. 341,345 (1996); Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified Theory ofProducts Liability:
Reviving the CausativeConcept ofLegal Fault, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1277, 1290 (1994).
Even some judges freely admit Brown v. Kendall's politics and history. Magrine v. Spector, 241
A.2d 637, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (Botter, J., dissenting); Ragnone v. Portland Sch. Dist.,
633 P.2d 1287, 1296-97 (Or. 1981).
77. 383 U.S. at 18. The same kind of naivet6, rooted in a misunderstanding of the negligence test
itself, may lead a court to reject the negligence parallel despite the admonitions of the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit.
[T]he Federal Circuit has stated that the person of ordinary skill in the art is
analogous to another fictitious person: the reasonable person used to analyze tort
negligence cases. I question the usefulness of that comparison. In negligence
cases, judges often can decide whether certain behavior is reasonable by
comparing the facts in the particular case to the facts in cases with similar fact
patterns. Metaphorically speaking, we know what the reasonable person would
do because he or she has been there before. Patent cases involving obviousness
ordinarily do not involve anything like a 'similar fact pattern.' The nature of
patent law necessarily implies that each situation is new.
Indian Head Indus., Inc. v. Ted Smith Equip. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1095, 1107 n.9 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The
problem with case-by-case development, however, is that the expected certainty may prove as elusive
in patent law as in negligence law. See infra note 87 (discussing the uncertainty of the negligence law
standard).
78. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 90 (1992).
Horwitz differs with some other legal historians by observing that the legal standard had already
changed by the time of the Brown v. Kendalldecision. The notoriety of the case, according to Horwitz,
is not due to any radical shift in doctrine, but rather to Holmes having chosen the case to exemplify the
doctrinal change.

HeinOnline -- 56 S. C. L. Rev. 356 2004-2005

2004]

PATENT POLITICS

case into their economic and policy surroundings. That the negligence formula can
have such dramatic economic consequences shows that the formula somehow
conceals value preferences which allow a choice between competing economic
interests. Whether objective tests generally have that potential seems hardly more
arguable.
Unless a court uses a time-machine, the test is clearly, and only, one of
hindsight, a necessity the Federal Court nevertheless forbids.79 What is the meaning
of a proposed hindsight analysis accompanied by a warning against its use? The
only conclusion is that the Federal Circuit was encouraging courts, armed with
knowledge of the invention (knowledge which necessarily makes the invention
appear more obvious than it otherwise might), to be less demanding than they might
otherwise be. Leaving aside the underlying confusion of the standard and warning,
the test also leaves unanswered the question of how demanding a court should be.
This utter flexibility and indeterminacy makes the ordinary practitioner test, like all
such objective tests, a completely contingent one, despite the Federal Circuit's
insistence that the underlying level of ordinary skill (upon which nonobviousness
is based) is a question of fact.8" Unsurprisingly, this inherently indeterminate and
contingent inquiry endures criticism as a kind of result-oriented jurisprudence and
draws well-meant but naive proposals to "legitimize" the process.
Currently, it appears that when the PTO or Federal Circuit is
faced with a technically obvious invention that the judges or
examiners intuitively recognize should have patent protection
(that is, they intuitively respond to the economic nonobviousness
of the invention), they are forced to bend the technical
nonobviousness doctrine to fit what they perceive to be the only
just outcome. By giving the agency and the court a label for what
they are doing, the practice can be legitimized and brought out so
that it can be discussed without subterfuge.8"
Legitimizing a test expressly designed to accommodate these judgments, just
like the test for negligence, is unnecessary. The test's resemblance to the
reasonable person standard, particularly as routinely applied to industrial matters,
is striking. The Federal Circuit has said that the level of ordinary skill in a
particular art depends by reference on the "educational level of the inventor, type

79. The Federal Circuit firmly forbids courts "from using their own insight or, worse yet,
hindsight, to gauge obviousness." Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); ISCO
Int'l, Inc. v. Conductus, Inc., No. C.A. 01-487 GMS, 2003 WL 279561, at *6 (D. Del. Feb 10, 2003)
(quoting Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355).
80. See Schneider (Eur.) AG v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., Nos. 94-1317, 94-1410, 94-1456, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 9754, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) ("Although obviousness is ultimately a legal
conclusion, it rests upon underlying findings of fact.") (citation omitted).
81. Boyd, supra note 11, at 339. As to the primary role of commercial success in determining
nonobviousness despite its label as a "secondary consideration," see Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note
22, at 446, 451-52.
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of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions, rapidity of innovation,
82
sophistication of technology, and educational level of active workers in the field.
Not only does this statement suggest the typical negligence formula as contained
in the famous Learned Hand negligence calculus, 3 but it noticeably resembles the
professional standard of care 4 formulation that frequently appears in medical
malpractice cases. A comparison to the Restatement provision about professionals
is instructive: "It is that special form of competence which is not part of the
ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of acquired
learning, and aptitude developed by special training and experience.""
The application of that provision in, for instance, the health industry,
effectively allocates national resources.86 By so defining the qualifications of this

practitioner, whose knowledge, ability, and skills will be the basis for measuring
the inventiveness and thus patentability of the invention, the PTO and ultimately

82. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 449-50 (Fed. Cir.
1986). See also Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000). That case provides
as follows:
Factors that may be considered in determining the ordinary level of skill in the art
include: 1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the prior art solutions
to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 4) the
sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational level of active workers
in the field.
Id. But see Wigley, supra note 38, at 599 (claiming erroneously that Bausch & Lomb lists those factors
"excluding the inventor").
83. "Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability
be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied
by P: i.e., whether B < PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
84. This observation is a double-edged sword for the argument made here, because the professional
standard is very often less hypothetical than the ordinary reasonable person formula and can become more
or less synonymous with custom and practice. To that extent, the professional standard is arguably entirely
empirical. The problem of values inherent to empiricism aside, courts routinely deny that the professional
standard is quite the same as custom and practice, even though the standard derives from empirical
influence. Those courts maintain the right to reject a kind of "quasi" reasonable person standard in
connection with actual custom and practice upon a finding that such real-world activity is itself negligent.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. a (1965).
86. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), for instance, is only one of the more notorious
examples of a decision, based on the reasonable person or its professional standard variation, that forced
an entire industry to restructure its allocation of resources. The Washington Supreme Court, discarding
the unquestioned professional standard that the trial court applied, said, "The precaution of giving this
test to detect. .. glaucoma. .. is so imperative that irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the
ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required ..."Id. at 983. The court
relied on Learned Hand for support. Id. In In re E. Transportation Co., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932), Hand said that ultimately, the reasonableness of a professional standard is a question of law:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is
never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
The Federal Circuit followed the same course in Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Fed. Appx. 925, 928 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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a reviewing court effectively decide how and where to allocate national industrial
resources.
Admittedly, the problem with the ordinary practitioner standard, or any
variation of the "reasonable person" standard, is not collecting enough facts, or in
this case of deciding exactly how much the ordinary practitioner would know and
consider. If the problem of nonobviousness were simply one of proof, it would be
a solely causal one, raising problems relating to particular and individual cases.
But, the problem is not one of proof just as proof is never the issue in negligence
law either.8 7
Any focus on problems of proof ignores the evaluative dimension in negligence
and to the extent the tests are similar, as the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
insist, that of patent law also. "More evidence is useless unless we know what kind
of evidence is relevant, and how it is relevant,"8 " but any hope that the "right"
evidence will or can avoid policy choices is certainly futile. In negligence law, for
instance, "value judgments are necessary in order to determine how the legal
decisionmaker should select among the many possible meanings of the 'burdens'
of a precaution, or the 'benefits' of taking a precaution (including the 'reasonably
foreseeable' probability of harmful outcomes, and the 'severity' of the possible
outcomes)." 9 One could probably observe how the ordinary practitioner would
consider an innovation obvious by considering how much effort to apply to the
problem while assessing how likely an innovation is to result and how useful it is

87. When considering the faith articulated in John Deere that the ordinary practitioner standard
would, in the end, yield some consistency, one cannot help but reflect on the notorious short line of
cases (two) from Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) to Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). In Goodman, Justice Holmes had the occasion to demonstrate, or so
he apparently thought, that however uncertain the reasonable person standard appeared, the genius of
the common law would eventually yield certainty, given enough time, as similar fact situations
accumulated in sufficient abundance. Goodman was a simple stop, look, and listen case where Holmes
assumed he could safely set down a certain rule from the negligence standard. "It is true ... that the
question of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct,
and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts." Goodman, 275 U.S.
at 70. Only seven years later, he was forced to eat his words, although Justice Cardozo actually took
that meal, when confronted with a stop, look, and listen case at an intersection where stopping would
have been even more dangerous than just continuing with caution. The Court could not ignore
Goodman. "There is no doubt that the opinion in that case is correct in its result.... But the court did
not stop there. It added a remark, unnecessary upon the facts before it, which has been a fertile source
of controversy." Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102. This statement signified the end of the idea of certainty
through time, but one wonders why the Court still clung to that faith in John Deere, when it asserted
that the test's "difficulties," like those of negligence, "should be amenable to a case-by-case
development." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
88. Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairnessas Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REv. 901, 915 (2001).
89. Id. For other in-depth analyses of these issues, see Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of
Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 105, 106 (2003) (arguing the Hand formula is overly simplified);
James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REv. 377 (2002) (comparing
negligence to strict liability); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing,the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv. 813 (2001) (discussing
the relationship between the reasonable person standard and the Hand formula).
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likely to be. The BPL 9 calculation of patent law's ordinary practitioner test is
certainly the twin of its negligence sibling.
In patent law, this parallelism translates into the question of whether the
ordinary practitioner, invested with as many characteristics as the court or PTO may
decide, will then consider the invention obvious. In the end, that last step of the
problem is really a leap into space. This step produces no fact, unlike the
preliminary determinations-for instance, the number of years of postgraduate
education a typical researcher might have completed, or the amount of time and
money reserved for research by industry (although the Federal Circuit, by insisting
that the determination of the level of skill is a question of fact, has rendered that
step as potentially arbitrary as any other administrative or trial court finding).9 The
last, and only crucial, decision regarding nonobviousness is whether the examiner,
judge, or jury considers the ordinary practitioner capable of imagining the
invention-whether it would have been obvious. That decision is not a decision of
fact, but of value, as the Federal Circuit has noted: "The ultimate determination of
whether an invention would have been obvious.. . is a legal conclusion based on
underlying findings of fact."92 This determination is essentially the meaning of
invention, and to the extent it is not a factual judgment, it is an entirely
indeterminate and contingent one. Actually, to the extent the Federal Circuit
correctly labels this a question of law, it becomes an incontestable policy
determination rather than a technical or factual question.
Indeed, one could credibly deny the existence of any other way of applying the
ordinarily skilled practitioner standard. As with the reasonable person test
generally, this test is neither value-neutral nor naively empirical. "In any empirical
investigation, value-neutral analysis is a fiction."93 Nevertheless, the Federal

90. According to Learned Hand's calculus, B, P, and L signify the burden of precautions,
probability of consequences, and gravity of injury, respectively. See supra note 83. For applications
of the Hand formula, see William E. Nelson, The Moral Perversity of the Hand Calculus, 45 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 759, 760 (2001) (applying the formula to the problem of homelessness); Joseph W. Rand, Wat
Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to Technological Change and Protecting the Attorney-Client
Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 361, 418 (2000) (applying the formula to attorneys);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight: The Case of
Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REv. 813, 822 (1999) (applying the formula to tobacco producers). In the patent,
nonobviousness calculus, the reviewing entity (PTO or federal court) weighs the burden of an increased
investment, the probability of achieving innovation, and the foreseeable utility or value of that
innovation.
91. The Supreme Court, ruling that Federal Rule 52(a) does not govern judicial review of PTO
decisions, has limited the rights of the Federal Circuit to review such decisions to an even greater
degree). Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161 (1999). See also Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000,
1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the post-Zurko standard for reviewing PTO decisions).
92. In re Beigel, 7 Fed. Appx. 959, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accord Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe ultimate determination of
whether an invention is obvious is a legal question based on the totality of the evidence."); Boehringer
Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual determinations.").
93. Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1273 (1997) (reviewing DON
DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY
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Circuit, probably in much the same manner as courts struggling with applying a socalled objective test in a value-neutral way, warns that the test should not partake
of hindsight: "In the first place, the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through
which a judge or jury views the prior art and the claimed invention. This reference
point prevents these deciders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight,
to gauge obviousness."94 As already observed, however, this admonition is
disingenuous and almost foolish.
If the test is particularly akin to a special kind of negligence, that of the
professional standard, its merit is that, like the professional standard, being
informed by industry custom and practice makes it less malleable and more
resistant to second-guessing. This appearance, however, is deceptive and fallacious.
While also true that the Federal Circuit has insisted that the ordinary practitioner
standard is entirely hypothetical, the court nevertheless demands that the PTO and
district courts carefully (but apparently hypothetically) articulate an industry
standard based on actual custom and practice, not on hypothetical values.
The professional negligence standard appears to be, like the practitioner of
ordinary skill test, "a standard of care defined by the prevailing custom in the
profession" instead of by the hypothetical reasonable person.95 Manipulating a
standard that actual practice defines might seem difficult, but the professional
standard, supposedly anchored to actual practice, is notoriously subject to judicial
preferences about what should be, as opposed to what is, the actual practice.
"[S]ome jurisdictions which have adopted a professional standard of care
nonetheless expressly recognize that a plaintiff may prevail on a negligence claim
by showing that the entire industry was negligent."96 The same type of decision
arises when the PTO or a court holds an innovation that is indisputably obvious to
nevertheless be patentable, thus amounting to a massive ratcheting down of the
standard of obviousness as applied to that industry.97 To the extent patent cases are
similarly subject to such pressures, or where those pressures convince a court or the
PTO that an invention is obvious or nonobvious despite what the facts otherwise
indicate, the test remains indeterminate, contingent, and contextual.98 Naturally, the
Federal Circuit's decisive view that the question is legal rather than factual tends
to moot further criticism. 99

94. AI-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Accord Okajima v.
Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing AI-Site, 174 F.3d at 1324).
95. Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 654 N.E.2d 644, 650-51 (ill. App. Ct. 1995), rev'd on
other grounds, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (i1. 1996).
96. Id. at 651.
97. See supra note 52 (discussing "subterfuge").
98. Indeed, the observations of Boyd, Ebert, and Wigley, supra notes 1I, 18, & 38, and the results
in cases such as Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Fed. Appx. 925, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and even Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941), supra notes 86 & 46, reflect the
tendency of reviewing bodies to substitute their judgment for what the facts might otherwise seem to
compel.
99. The Supreme Court's decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), however, will
partially dampen, though not moot, this question. See supra note 91.

HeinOnline -- 56 S. C. L. Rev. 361 2004-2005

[Vol. 56: 337

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

D. Determining the Level of Skill
According to John Deere,' an assessment of the level of skill that the ordinary
practitioner possesses must precede the determination of nonobviousness.
Determining that level of skill is rather prosaic. Recall that the Federal Circuit
instructs courts to establish the "educational level of the inventor, type of problems
encountered in the art, prior art solutions, rapidity of innovation, sophistication of
technology, and educational level of active workers in the field."''
The Federal Circuit decisions underscore the idea that the test of the ordinary
practitioner is entirely contingent, uncertain, and indefinite. In StandardOil Co.
v. American Cyanamid, the court said that the ordinary practitioner is one
possessing only "conventional wisdom

. . .

and is not one who undertakes to

innovate, whether by patient, and often expensive, systematic research or by
extraordinary insights .
,,o2 As one commentator asserts, the ordinary
practitioner is therefore "somewhat of a plodder ..

This "conventional

".."103

wisdom" is a far cry from the "flash of creative genius" ' 4 test and is intended to
make patentability far more likely. However, to the extent that test applies
differently to different industries," 5 it becomes the source of national industrial
policy. Commentators are not timid about suggesting such differentials. One
astonishingly candid suggestion, a call to relax the test of nonobviousness and
allow "biotechnological inventions [to] be given patents more easily in order to
foster the industry's growth,"' 6 demonstrates the intimate, though sometimes
barely recognized, connection between that test and national industrial policy.
Additionally, the assessment of skill, with all its apparent determinancy, is rife
with possibilities for manipulation. Consider this normal stipulation of a
practitioner's skill level:
[A] person possessing the stipulated level of ordinary skill would
have completed at least several college-level courses in computer
science or electrical engineering, would have been employed for

100. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
101. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
But see Wigley, supra note 38, at 598 (asserting that Bausch & Lomb lists those factors "excluding the
inventor," although the court's opinion clearly lists the inventor's education.).
102. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court
applied the same standard in Schneider (Eur.) AG v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., Nos. 94-1317, 94-1410, 941456, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9754, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 1995).
103. Ebert, supra note 19, at 22.
104. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
105. The recent PTO practice of applying a more demanding standard to business method patents
controversially seems to treat one field of technology differently than all others in possible violation of
TRIPS. Specifically, the PTO mandates "[a] new second-level review of all allowed applications in Class
705," which is essentially the business methods class. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO
WHITE PAPER:

AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS

METHODS), Section V.D., (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/quality.htim.
106. Boyd, supra note 11, at 313.
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several years in the field of engineering, developing and
designing gaming devices, and would have had some knowledge
of probability07 theory, random numbers, and computer
programming. 1
In this case, the PTO and the courts decided that, given an appropriate investment
in industry such that employees received this education, training, experience, and
employment, normal work product is not entitled to a patent monopoly. However,
any innovations by employees with greater qualifications or within enterprises that
invest enough more to exceed this level, would be more deserving. One can
imagine, since both parties agreed to this stipulation, that the plaintiff patent owner
was urging that the industry need only invest in minimal qualifications, while the
defendant infringer urged that the industry, to merit patent monopolies, should
employ college graduates at a minimum and perhaps even those with doctorates.
When the PTO and a reviewing court decide--or in this case, given the stipulation,
accept-that this minimal level of investment is worthy of a patent monopoly, they
impose a national industrial policy that rewards a very specific allocation of
national resources, at least in this particular sector or "art." The patent subsidy, in
other words, is contingent upon a very specific level of industrial development, and
this contingency is the result of a calculus in which this decision seems disguised
and about which those performing the calculus seem entirely ignorant. Most
important, this decision involving solely non-technological features forms the basis
for an eventual decision regarding whether an innovation is a "patentable
invention."
The unavoidable conclusion is that the test of nonobviousness and the level of
ordinary skill are subject to an almost infinite flexibility and are highly
manipulable. Even so, Federal Circuit decisions occasionally approach a level of
incoherence that the flexibility of governing law simply cannot explain. For
instance, in Thompson v. Thompson,' the PTO found obvious a claimed invention
for a street light designed to avoid sky light contamination by extending the
reflector upward (how else, one might ask) beyond a certain point. The Federal
Circuit agreed that such a simple and arguably intuitive design was obvious, but its
explanation is baffling.
The level of ordinary skill in the art of outdoor lighting design
appears to be not especially high. There are few differences
between the claimed invention and the scope and content of the
prior art .... We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Board's determination that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have been motivated to modify the industry standard ....

We

107. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
108. 13 Fed. Appx. 925 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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therefore affirm its judgment that the invention as a whole would
109
have been obvious ....
What could the Federal Circuit have been thinking? Why did the court observe
that the level of skill was "not especially high?" Where the level of skill is not
high, innovations are more likely nonobvious. Perhaps the court meant that the
level of innovations in this field are so rudimentary that they are routinely obvious.
That conclusion, however, flies in the face of the test for nonobviousness, the
measurement of which depends upon the level of skill of ordinary practitioners,
including practitioners who, as here, are perhaps not especially skillful." ° This
statement casts doubt on whether the Federal Circuit, the court vested with almost
total responsibility for United States patent policy, understands the most central
doctrine of patent law. If so, the test for nonobviousness becomes flexible not only
because the test is inherently indeterminate, but because the court vested with
reviewing authority has an incomplete grasp of the ruling law. "' To give credit to
the court, another interpretation of Thompson is that the Federal Circuit feels free
to reject an industry standard that would characterize as nonobvious what the court
feels to be an undeserving innovation. That line of reasoning is the basis for this
entire Article.
These decisions cannot really set industrial policy if merely reflecting existing
levels of investment. However, as Thompson illustrates, the courts hardly feel
bound to vindicate decisions of industries whose judgment they apparently
question. Two locations exist within the nonobviousness calculus in which a
departure from existing practice is inevitable. The first results from the existence
of more than one level of qualifications. Any sizeable industry, perhaps even small
ones, will have various levels from which the PTO or reviewing court can choose
the most appropriate. Even when they choose, they frequently choose a range that
inevitably gives carte blanche to a conclusion of either obviousness or
nonobviousness: "The unchallenged level of ordinary skill in the art was high, a
minimum of a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering often being accompanied
by a master's degree and several years of design experience. ' 2
Within that framework, does a court apply the highest possible standard, that
of master's degrees and several years of experience, or something closer to their
minimum bachelor's degree finding? Having chosen that level, afactual decision

109. Id. at 928 (emphasis added).
110. One surely must wonder whether the Federal Circuit here revealed, however unintentionally,
that it is engaged in exactly that industrial restructuring that Helling v. Carey notoriously criticized, a
restructuring inherent in the flexibility of the professional standard, let alone the infinitely more flexible
reasonable person standard. The Court may simply have misspoken, actually intending to assert that,
while the level was not very high, it certainly exceeded the skill necessary to achieve this pedestrian
advance.
11. Boyd supports this conclusion, believing the Federal Circuit resorts to subterfuge when so
inclined. See supra note 52. If Thompson is any measure, however, the court need not resort to
subterfuge to avoid a doctrine of which it lacks a full mastery.
112. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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about what would be "obvious" at such a level is unimaginable. The court must
make a prediction (from hindsight of course) regarding what one with that level of
qualifications would think. Since evidence about the only one who demonstrably
did think about the issue-the inventor-is inadmissible, the conclusion is a leap
into space. Whether one becomes more or less demanding when making that
prediction simply is not subject to constraint. Even an entirely empirical
measurement, in this context, is hardly "value-neutral." ' 3 Unless industries ignore
judicial decisions-and industries clearly acknowledge that decisions of the PTO
and federal courts govern their investment choices' 4 -the court's approach is
surely an industrial policy. The question of whether that policy is rational or
democratic is open for debate.
E. The Impact of the Nonobviousness Inquiry: Its Economic and Political

Significance
Patent law screens innovations with four basic tests: subject matter," 5
Subject matter (the initial
nonobviousness," 6 novelty,"' and utility." 8
determination of whether a particular innovation is even eligible for patent
consideration by being, for example, a question of business methods, living

113. Meyer, supra note 93, at 1273.
114. "Effective patent and copyright protection: intellectual property is the lifeblood of venturebacked high tech and biotech firms." Beyond the Tax Cut: Unleashing the Economy: HearingBefore
the House Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy, Technology, and Economic Growth of the
Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 49 (2001) (statement of E. Floyd Kvamme, CoChairman of the President's Council of Advisors for Science and Technology). "Wall Street attaches
enormous significance to gene patents. When a statement last spring by President Clinton and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair was briefly misunderstood as portending changes in patent law, billions of
dollars evaporated from the stock market overnight." Justin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit
Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at AI. The Federal Circuit strongly considers whether patent
doctrine, such as the doctrine of equivalents, has a substantial effect upon investment. See Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997);
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 952
F.2d 1357 (Fed. Cit. 1991). See also Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal
Obviousness andthe BalanceBetween Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 53, 55
(1996). An important corollary is that other countries apparently believe that the "right" patent regime
will attract foreign investment. "National differences in patent regimes that affect the level of IP
protection in each country clearly impact the willingness and ability of firms to invest in joint
international research ventures, manufacturing, and other forms of investment." Robert Dugal,
PharmaceuticalResearch Investment, 53 CAN. CHEM. NEws 28 (2001). Notably, however, in an
otherwise favorable approach to strong domestic IP systems, a PTO Primary Examiner nevertheless
pointed out the reality that "developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe which
ha[d] adopted strong IPR systems ha[d] attracted little FDI while China, Brazil, Argentina and Thailand
ha[d] attracted high levels of FDI despite their weak IPRs." Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual
Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 288 (2004).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
116. § 103(b).
117. § 101.
118. Id.
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organisms, or computer programs), subject to measurement under the
idea/application dichotomy, inevitably involves a balancing of the policy evaluation
of the competitive possibilities against the perceived "value" of the art or industrial
sector, the value of continued competition, and the price the public must expect to
pay." 9 Thus, subject matter is important, because through the analysis, the system
decides whether an innovation is even eligible for the patent monopoly or,
alternatively, is merely an unpatentable concept ("laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas"). 20 Although this decision has been historically
important, an erroneous Federal Circuit interpretation of governing Supreme Court
precedent has limited the range of choices.' Of the three remaining tests (novelty,

119. Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable, because
monopolies over such essentials would impose an insuperable burden on industry. No one could
compete with a monopolized idea, and the public would pay the intolerable price of foregoing all
competition. Few, if any, can doubt "the allocative effects ... even from the narrow viewpoint of
efficiency," involved in the subject matter inquiry. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional
Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1247 (1998). For instance, "many noted the significant impact
on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries that resulted from Chakrabarty,a Supreme Court
decision affirming the expansive scope of patentable subject matter." Toshiko Takenaka, Patent
Infingement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will IncreasedPatentInfringement Damage
Awards Revive the JapaneseEconomy?, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309, 366 (2000). The values extend
beyond the economic realm. "Here too, the question is at once difficult and urgent: do we need new
and activist genetic policy, or can traditional norms be shaped in the courts to accommodate new
problems?" Glenn McGee, Foreword: Genetic Exceptionalism, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 565, 569
(1998). The values do, however, always involve the economic calculation of an expanded or contracted
monopoly. "[W]hat type of 'legal monopoly' should be granted to an innovator whose significant
contribution to the public welfare can be diminished quickly by a competitor's development of an
improved product or technique?" Kevin J. McGough & Daniel P. Burke, A Casefor Expansive Patent
Protectionof Biotechnology Inventions, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85, 86 (1992).
120. The Federal Circuit has interpreted Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980),
which held a process involving living micro-organisms patentable for its nonnatural combination,
meaning no limits exist outside of the statute itself as to the proper subject of a patent. For instance, the
court stated that "it is improper to read limitations into § 101 on the subject matter that may be patented
where the legislative history indicates that Congress clearly did not intend such limitations." State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064-65 (1992) (providing that,
"in the absence of legislated limits on the meaning of the Act, courts should not presume to construct
limits). Chakrabarty,however, did not interpret the 1952 Act as eliminating all common-law rules,
such as the prohibition of business method patents, and courts can consistently, and certainly in accord
with traditional rules of statutory construction, read the Patent Act in conjunction with the judicial rules
in effect at the time of passage. The only exceptions are those rules that the Act explicitly overruled,
such as the last sentence of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (overruling Cuno Eng'g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)). More important, Chakrabarty acknowledged that the
limits upon subject matter are not exclusively in the text of the statute. The Court provided, "This is
not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable." 447 U.S. at 309. Why the Federal
Circuit interprets Chakrabartyas forbidding any limits not present in the statute when the Supreme
Court itself identified three such limits is puzzling.
121. The Federal Circuit has misread Chakrabartyto mandate patentability of everything "under
the sun" and to banish all judicial exceptions. This interpretation is clearly a misunderstanding, since
Chakrabarty itself mandated three very broad judicial exceptions-"laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas."
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utility, and nonobviousness),' 2 2 only nonobviousness (the classical test of
"invention"' 23 ) presents the kind of serious dispute also inherent to the subject
matter inquiry. The other two tests of invention-novelty and utility' 24-are either
purely factual inquiries or present virtually no serious disputed issues'25 and seem
so obviously factual as to not raise the question of industrial policy. Thus, only the
subject matter and nonobviousness inquiries are decisive, in a political and socioeconomic sense, to the grant of patent rights.
As discussed, nonobviousness intuitively seems to address the process by
which the inventor made the discovery (an inquiry the statute disallows2 6 ). The
analysis considers the general competitive nature of the field and measures the
social value of competition (inevitably subjectively evaluated) against the required
incentive to produce new goods. In the end, the court effectively sets the inventing
entity's "wage" or "profit," which the public then pays.'27 The accomplishment of

122. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103.
123. "The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized 'nonobviousness' as the operative
test of the section, rather than the less definite 'invention' language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought
had led to 'a large variety' of expressions in decisions and writings." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
125. Genuine policy disputes do arise in the determination of novelty and utility. With regard to
the former, the borders clearly allow dispute, but the heartland is generally certain and definite. By
contrast, nonobviousness, which is inherently political, is essentially all border with no definite or
certain territory. Utility offers some opportunity to make serious, even extraordinary, value judgments
although recent case law has reduced the ordinary issue of utility into a pedestrian exercise.
Nevertheless, in the absence of any attempt to demonstrate utility, or in cases where utility is entirely
speculative, the Supreme Court has employed the otherwise minimal utility requirement to prevent
fishing expeditions. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
126. The infamous last sentence of the first paragraph of section 103, adopted in 1952, instructs
the PTO and courts to ignore "the manner in which the invention was made," 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
cementing Congressional rejection of the "flash of creative genius" requirement from Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
127. The "wage" that the commercialization of the patent monopoly guarantees is an exception
to the general rule that all are free to compete in a market in which intangibles are presumably available
to the public. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989). The
Bonito Boats Court explained:
Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a
congressional determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best
served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already
available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from publicly
available material.
...The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody
a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent
is the exception.
Accord Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1208 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51); Escada AG v. The Limited, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (quoting the same language).
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this complex and rather fundamental intrusion into the public domain depends upon
language that claims an exclusively private (property) character.12

128. Copyright is the same. Originality itself, with a minimal definition, appears either highly
objective or irrelevant. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991). However, considering originality in conjunction with the copyrightability
of derivative works or copies, as well as the idea-expression dichotomy, the result is similar to that of
patent law. Whether something is in the realm of copyrightable ideas depends upon its subjectively
perceived value as balanced against social needs. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317,1324 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (discussing the "scope of copyright"). The decision of the court will, in the end, set the price of
the product after consideration of the possibilities of continued competition, "blocking," and the need
for incentive. That resulting decision turns on the court's political views regarding society and even
human nature, because the need for incentive will hinge on an optimistic, as opposed to a pessimistic,
view of human nature. Fair use considers, perhaps most dramatically, the economic conditions
surrounding the authorship, as well as the parties' needs in relation to society. The economic impact
is "the single most important element of fair use." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
574 (1994) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,566 (1985)). Most
important, with the possible exception of fair use, these calculations supposedly consider something
inherent about the work and the author, rather than the competitive environment. Weinreb may have
suggested this idea when he wrote, 'The boundary of copyrightable subject matter does not carry its
rationale on its face ...."Weinreb, supra note 119, at 1210.
The situation differs in trademark law only to the extent that classical doctrine is binding. Strict
trademark law allows for little external balancing. However, modem trademark law reveals a massive
intrusion into public matters under the guise of private rights. Whether a mark is generic, or even
descriptive, depends upon a concealed judgment (Weinreb's hidden calculation) concerning the
desirability for further competition, because the inquiry focuses on the degree of reasonable alternatives:
Is the subject of proposed protection "the" descriptive name for the product? The determination
depends upon the court's willingness to force consumers to use "other" terms. See, e.g., Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1995) (allowing, under the so-called "color depletion"
theory, the appropriation of colors, unless the public has no more colors available). Likewise, whether
the definition of a "product" or "service" is broad enough to include, for instance, T-shirts, or narrowly
to include only T-shirts with a certain mark, will determine the dispute. The court's defmition of the
market depends upon its subjective attitude towards the relative strength of marketers vis-a-vis
consumers. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding likelihood of confusion partly based upon the strength of the mark, a factor that depends
somewhat upon the amount of the proprietor's investment); MB Fin. Bank, N.A. v. MB Real Estate
Servs., No. 02-C-5925, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21051 * 18 (E.D. Il. Nov. 20, 2003) (basing the strength
of a mark on, among other factors, "the amount of money spent on advertising the mark"). That
definition is essentially a public matter, yet its determination depends upon a private, objective
framework which claims to consider solely the term or the product. However, trademark law, which
is even less open than either patent or copyright law, appears to be non-monopolistic and even nonregulatory. By putting the debate in notions of monopoly, the claim that trademark is anti-competitive
becomes trivial, for the monopolization of a word or symbol is hardly important. In terms of simple
competition, the product differentiation and obstacles to entry that result from the monopolization of
a term become potentially far more powerful than the direct monopolization of a product through patent
or copyright. This result is due to the relatively lesser monopoly over the product in trademark law
continuing in perpetuity. Although trademark holders must renew their rights every ten years, their
ultimate term is limitless, 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2000), whereas the admitted monopoly over the product
of patent or copyright law expires in twenty years, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000), or, at the most,
approximately ninety-five years, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
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The patent statute clearly determines, or more accurately, allows courts, in a
more decentralized manner, to determine the allocation of productive resources.
Nearly forty years ago, Machiup observed that the patent system determines "the
overall allocation of productive resources in a developing economy
and ...whether ...the allocation to industrial research ...is deficient, excessive,
or just right."' 29

One way to understand more fully how the patent regime constitutes a
government subsidy and national industrial policy is to note its similarity to the
well-known "matching fund" subsidy system that both the public and private
sectors employ. Under "matching fund" systems, a patron or government agency
agrees to subsidize an activity according to a predetermined proportion of funds
invested (or, in the case of a nonprofit organization such as a cultural or charitable
organization, funds raised). Thus, for each dollar the enterprise invests, the patron
offers to match that dollar with a certain amount, a proportion which varies
according to the patron's demands. In some ways, the amount the enterprise raises
or invests represent a kind of "good faith" commitment and assurance that the
enterprise is worthy of the subsidy. The proportion of matching funds to privately
raised funds represents the confidence of the patron in the enterprise, as well as a
demand upon the enterprise to prove its worth. 3
In that sense, the nonobviousness calculation simply represents the proportion,
demand, or confidence, that the government as patron assigns to the enterprise. A
high nonobviousness threshold is equivalent, in this analysis, to a demand that the
enterprise invest more inits own activities. When the standard of nonobviousness
is low, the government essentially says that the enterprise-or, in this case, the
entire industry or "art"--need not invest much of its own funds. A very low
nonobviousness threshold signals a decision to provide massive subsidization of the
entire industry.
Consequently, the nonobviousness inquiry represents a decision industry by
industry, or art by art, to subsidize certain industries virtually entirely, to fund
others more or less equivalently, and to require still others to proceed without

129. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 445 (2d Sess. 1958) (authored by Fritz Machlup).
130. Although generally associated with private giving, matching funds has some legal significance,

mostly in tax law, where some suggest a conversion of the present charitable donation tax deduction into
a kind of matching fund for reasons of fairness and equity. See Paul R. McDaniel, FederalMatching
Grantsfor CharitableContributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377,
396-97 (1972); Boris I. Bittker, CharitableContributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAx
L. REV. 37, 38 (1972); Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency: Designing a
NondiversionConstraint,56 SMU L. REV. 675,708-09 (2003). Actual matching fund programs also exist
between government and industry. See 15 U.S.C. § 278n (2000); 15 C.F.R. §§ 290.3(e), 290.5(a)(3)(ii),
291.4(o. The Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Program, which provides matching grants
to industry, is an explicit example of national industrial policy and is the target of an especially vitriolic
reaction in legal literature. See, e.g., Roger Pilon, On the Folly and Illegitimacy of IndustrialPolicy, 5
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 105 (1993) (likening former President Clinton's extreme-centrist policies to
"the far-reaching forms that have characterized the socialist world").
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government assistance. Fashioning a more ruthless or at least determined national
industrial policy would be difficult.
The patent system has drawn this line rather casually for two centuries. While
our system does not grant patents to applications without any examination at all, the
PTO process remains cursory.'3 1 The social cost of this approach, which depends
upon a calculus that favors granting more rather than fewer questionable patents, 32
troubled even Jefferson:
Instead of refusing a patent in the first instance ...the patent now

issues of course, subject to be declared void on such principles as
should be established by the courts of law.... [H]owever... we

might in vain turn over all the lubberly volumes of the law to find
a single ray which would lighten the path of the mechanic or the
mathematician. It is more within the information of a board of
academical professors, and a previous refusal of patent would
better guard our citizens against harassment by law-suits. 33

131. Everyone seems to recognize that the PTO is overworked and underfunded. See Nancy J.
Linck et al., A New Patent ExaminationSystem for the New Millennium, 35 HOUS. L. REv. 305, 307-08
(1998); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, Post-GrantReview of Patents: Enhancingthe Quality
of the Fuel of Interest, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 231, 232 (2003). The dominant theory
governing our patent regime is that the courts are ultimately responsible for policing the bona fides of
patents. One author asks,
Does the invalidation of patents coming into the courts indicate a flaw in the
patent system? Or does it suggest that the two tribunals are effectively serving
different functions-the Patent and Trademark Office to grant patents on the basis
of prior art appraisals, and courts to weed out subject matter that more highlyfocussed factfindings-and subsequently-occurring events-prove to have been
obvious?
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 384 (rev.

3d ed.

1993). Indeed, just as it has been asserted that almost any prosecutor could get an indictment against
a ham sandwich, see Do We Need GrandJuries?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1985, at Al6 (reporting that
Chief Justice Wachtler favored abolishing New York's grand juries from most felony cases, because
grand juries "would 'indict a ham sandwich' if the district attorney asked nicely"), Patent Office statics
themselves establish themselves that almost any patent lawyer can probably get one patented. Those
numbers reveal that just about every patent application is eventually approved by the PTO and a patent
ultimately issues. "[V]irtually all patent applications are successful in the end .. " Mickey Davis,
Summary of "Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office," by Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. (Cornerstone Research) and Ogden H. Webster, 11 Fed. Cir. B.J. (20012002), in TIIP Newsletter, Issue 2 003.1 (2003), available at http://www.researchon
innovation.org/tiip/archive/2003_ 1_b.htm.
132. In 1992, the PTO solicited comments on a proposed rule relaxing the ethical requirements
of patent attorneys. One comment called for stiffening rather than relaxing the rule, since denying some
good patents is preferable to burdening the public with unmerited monopolies. The PTO's response
ignored the unavoidable dilemma of having to choose between issuing some bad patents or denying
some good ones, instead rejecting the suggestion with the startling non sequitur: "The Office strives
to issue valid patents." Response to and Analysis of Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992).
133. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Isaac M'Pherson, supra note 28, at 182.
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Despite two centuries of concern, modem commentators seem to embrace the
essentially cavalier approach of a seemingly unchanging United States patent
system.'34 The Federal Circuit has actually embraced the situation Jefferson
deplored.' 35 The situation tends to deny that patent law derives from the application
of a utilitarian calculus,' 36 and it emphasizes the kind of private rights responsible
for the "harassment" Jefferson noted.
History demonstrates that patent grants are substantially political decisions.
During the post-New Deal era, judicial challenges routinely invalidated patents,
perhaps in part due to a somewhat skeptical national attitude towards business
attributable to the events of the Depression years. Since the creation of the Federal
a "proCircuit during the pro-business 1980s, however, the country has entered
37
patent" cycle that its boosters have coined "The Era of the Patent."'1
This cycle has few possible explanations. Either the earlier period was
"correct," and applicants now simply submit a higher proportion of truly inventive
innovations; the earlier period was "incorrect," and the Federal Circuit now
"correctly" applies the law; or both periods are "correct," but the law of patents
itself is extraordinarily flexible and embraces both. The first interpretation seems
to defy common sense in presuming that industry has somehow been "born again"
or that practitioners of an earlier era were less competent than current practitioners.
Either of the two remaining interpretations indicates the political responsiveness of
patent law.

134. Suggestions for reform often propose less, rather than more, examination. See Linck et al.,
supranote 131, at 318.
135. The Federal Circuit is notorious for validating patents that courts would have invalidated in
earlier eras. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy
Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 539 (1995) (questioning whether the Federal
Circuit may be victim of the "capture" phenomenon); Steven Cherensky, A Pennyfor Their Thoughts:
Employee-Inventors, PreinventionAssignment Agreements, Property,andPersonhood,81 CAL. L. REV.
595, 614 n.86 (1993) (noting that the Federal Circuit is more "pro-patent" than prior courts or the
Supreme Court); Chad King, Abort, Retry, Fail:Protectionfor Software-Relatedlnventions in the Wake
ofState Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1124
n.35 (2000) (claiming that "many of the Federal Circuit's decisions are reversals of patent application
rejections by the PTO Board of Appeals"); Lawrence M. Sung, Intellectual Property Protection or
Protectionism?Declaratory Judgment Use by Patent Owners Against ProspectiveInfringers, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 239, 248 n.47 (1992) (discussing the Federal Circuit's "pro-patent owner biases"). See also
Eric Schmitt, JudicialShift in Patent Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1986, at D2 (describing the Federal
Circuit to be "[tihe greatest impetus to the pro-patent shift" in American patent law).
136. Consider Professor Boyle's description of the system:
The current analysis is massively indeterminate at every stage. It is based on
claims for which there is inadequate empirical evidence .... As a system, it is
held together by definitional fiat, despite the fact that the definitions ... merely
reproduce the very tensions they were designed to resolve. Finally, the system is
both grounded on and imbued with an ahistorical and romanticized vision of
authorial creation: it takes as universal premise that which should be its
occasional conclusion.
Boyle, supra note 44, at 1533-34.
137. Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Propertyas a Trade lssue: From the ParisConvention to GAIT,
13 LEGAL STUD. FORuM 407, 412 (1989) (citing Robert P. Whipple, A New Era in Licensing, LES
NOUVELLES, Sept. 1987, at 109).
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To recapitulate, the ordinary practitioner test shares the vulnerability of the
reasonable person test, or of any hypothetical standard, to value judgments.
Although it certainly and substantially contributes to the political nature of the test,
the assessment of the level of ordinary skill, by either the PTO or a reviewing court,
does not draw the most dramatic implementation of these value judgments. Instead,
after determining the level of ordinary skill, the PTO or courts must reach a
completely hypothetical and therefore unconstrained determination: Would such
a person, who does not truly exist, armed with such skill, have thought the
invention obvious (a thought that never actually occurred)? No one asked this
question at the time of the invention, 3 ' so it is not a question of fact, and the actual
inquiry occurs in a time and place far removed from the relevant setting. The PTO
or court must reach a conclusion about what might have been, and developing this
conclusion requires that the court also ask what should have been. An apt
description of the system is that of a thought experiment-the would-have-shouldhave thought experiment.
The would-have-should-have thought experiment seeks to demonstrate that the
test of nonobviousness, and that of the practitioner of ordinary skill, is subject to
judgments concerning the appropriate amount of industrial investment'39 and is
therefore a form of national industrial policy. The judgment of what should have
been fatally infects the inquiry. When the PTO or court must determine whether
an ordinary practitioner would have considered an innovation obvious, the court
must remember that this consideration is entirely hypothetical. The PTO or court
must imagine the event and ask whether the practitioner "would have" reached a
conclusion of nonobviousness. One might criticize the industrial policy argument
by suggesting that a court which substitutes "should have" for "would have"
improperly applies the test. However, doing one without the other is impossible.
Since the event never occurred, when the PTO or court imagines whether an
ordinary practitioner "would have" reached a conclusion of nonobviousness,
shielding that inquiry from what the PTO or court believes the practitioner "should
have" done will be impossible.

138. One might characterize the nonobviousness inquiry as answering the unasked question.
139. The ordinary practitioner test is based, in theory, on the actual state of the art, but commonsense notions about what the state of the art should have been will inevitably infect any assessment of
what was the actual state of the art. This analysis is a retroactive application of the classic Humean "isought" distinction. Hume deemed impossible the task of separating our passions from our reason in
distinguishing what is from what ought to be. The ordinary practitioner test simply asks what was, but

notions of what should have been will always infect the answer.
Hume has achieved a notoriety of sorts for holding that the mind is not
"determin'd by reason" when it makes a causal inference, and for noticing that
ought-statements differ from is-statements, that the two are often conflated in
moral discourses, and that it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
relation [of oughtness] could be a deduction from others, which are entirely

different from it."
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, A CULTIVATED REASON: AN ESSAY ON HUME AND HUMEANIsM 16 (1960)

(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
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First, judges or the PTO will be unable to avoid imagining what should have
been done, as is all too human, even if trying to exclude this notion from their
conclusion. The real question then is whether the judges or the PTO can ignore their
thoughts, an impossibility that the would-have-should-have thought experiment
renders evident. Only if the PTO or court has no opinion about what should have
been done (in the sense of whether the industry should have invested more or less)
can a conclusion about what "would have" been done possibly be immune from the
"should have" value judgment. To the extent that the reviewing entity feels, for
instance, that more resources should have been invested in a certain sector, 4 ' and
thinks therefore that certain innovations should have been obvious, reaching a
judgment regarding what "would have" been done, without influence from its views
about what "should have" been done, is impossible. Imagine a PTO or court that
believes an innovation should have been obvious given investment of appropriate
resources. Now consider its determination of what a practitioner would have
thought. If the PTO or court firmly believes that an innovation should have been
obvious, how can that body conclude that such innovation nevertheless would not
have been? Just as is true of several centuries of negligence law, judgments about
an appropriate amount of investment will inevitably be part of the judgment
concerning what would have been done.
V.

THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE TRUMP OF PROPERTY

Although based on the test of nonobviousness, the foregoing description of
patent law as a form of competition regulation, let alone as a form of national
industrial policy, is obviously not the conventional one. Organized patent interests
(the patent bar, patent proprietors, and their sponsors) do not espouse that view, but
instead habitually offer a more cramped description of patent law. One might call
that description the trump of property-a strategy to secure the claim that
proprietors can exclusively own patents, and to eliminate any argument that the
public has a continuing interest in issued patents. 4' That description promotes

140. See Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Fed. Appx. 925, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
141. This argument surfaces in the "debate" over whether a patent is a monopoly. Although the
Supreme Court, among others, has never faltered in so characterizing the patent monopoly, a small but
vocal minority seems determined to argue the point.
As early as the 1920s, U.S. Supreme Court cases can be found saying that a patent
is a monopoly, and in a lot of what I think was fairly poor reasoning, even as late
as the 1970s, the Court continued to reiterate the theme that a patent is a
monopoly .... It is only in the more recent Supreme Court cases that it has been
made clearer that a patent is not a monopoly. It may be an opportunity for "rent
seeking," to use the economist's term, but it is not a monopoly.
Proceedingsof the Sixth Annual Seminar on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: Free
Markets in Latin America: New Games-New Rules, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 191, 256 (1993) (statement of
Robert M. Sherwood). "As a side issue, it is worth noting that the holder of a patent does not really
have a 'monopoly' over the invention in question in a strict sense." Jacqueline Lipton, Protecting
Valuable Commercial Information in the DigitalAge: Law, Policy andPractice, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y
1, 3 n.9 (2001). However, the Supreme Court has always described the patent monopoly in exactly that
manner. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
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patents as just another kind of property, but firmly rejects any suggestion that patent
law represents either a form of competition regulation or a national industrial
policy. With a firm foundation in free market theories, the strong claim that patents
are just another form of property implicitly rejects the idea that patent law serves
any regulatory function.
An analysis of market realities in light of free market theories undermines that
notion. Surprisingly patents fare badly under a free market lens.' 42 The
justification for patent law depends on the underlying model of free market
competition, even though patents represent a paradoxical reversion to monopoly.
The notion that competition polices patents-rendering them either not true

monopolies or some benign form of monopolies-is an essential part of patent
jurisprudence. For instance, an effective bar against consumer challenges to patent
invalidity,' 43 the premise for which is the supposition that the patent holder's
competitors are more effective patent validity contestants than other potential
plaintiffs, requires that a party face the threat of an infringement suit in order to
have standing. Obviously, only a competitor will generally face threats of such a

U.S. 661, 672 (1990); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohrn & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980); BlonderTongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of IM., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 149 (1950). This "debate" seemingly has only one point: to sanitize the patent monopoly
so that it more closely resembles simple property. A monopoly, of course, virtually compels the public
interest. Thus, the trump of property depends on asserting not only that a patent is simple property, but
also that it does not constitute an economic phenomenon, like a monopoly, in which the public has a
particular interest. The introduction of the trump of property theory will routinely rely on cases of a
different era. See, for instance, Rose, supra note 37, at 566 n.6 (citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908)); Philip Konecny, Windfall Property Rightsfor the Left Out CoInventor Who Gets Let into the Patent, 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141 (quoting the same
language); Joan E. Schaffner, PatentPreemptionUnlocked, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1100 n.89 (1995)
(citing United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) and Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v.
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)).
142. Many libertarians, practically wedded to the free market system, surprisingly oppose patent
rights. One libertarian critique concludes,

We see, then, that a system of property rights in 'ideal objects' necessarily
requires violation of .other individual property rights, e.g., to use one's own
tangible property as one sees fit. Such a system... subverts the first-occupier
rule. IP, at least in the form of patent and copyright, cannot be justified.
N. Stephan Kinsella, Against IntellectualProperty, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDS. 1, 44 (2001).
143. Basically, only two kinds of parties have standing to bring an infringement suit, or, conversely,
an action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity: a patent proprietor (or one standing in her shoes) or a
potential infringer. Thus, unless a proprietor, or a proprietor's assignee, only parties facing threats of
infringement lawsuits may bring claims themselves. Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc.,
357 F.3d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2004); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Consumers or public interest organizations seeking to declare a patent invalid do not have that requisite
standing. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920,925,938-39 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But see People
with Aids Health Group v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., No. 91-0574, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 578, at *7
(D.D.C. 1992) (leaving open the possibility of standing for patients who alleged a credible threat of
infringement if they used AZT without authority of the patent holder). For more on this subject, see
generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323 (2000) (providing a comprehensive overview of standing in IP
cases-covering mandatory, optional, and forbidden parties).
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suit, but competitors do not routinely challenge even questionable patents, because
the market is not truly free and competitive. The patent system's reliance on the
free market for policing may be misplaced. To the extent that a kind of "good old
boys" network encourages patent holders to respect each other's turf, patent law
suffers a fatal corruption.'" Recent literature suggests that industrial collusion
infects the entire patent regime. 45 Nevertheless, the law remains that
consumers-those who actually pay the patent tribute-are ineligible to contest the
validity of a patent grant.
When one considers the routine granting of patents in non-adversarial
proceedings, the infrequent court challenges, and, since the advent of the Federal
Circuit, the increased invulnerability of patents, patent law's characterization as a
welcome shelter from unrestricted competition is not surprising.
It wasn't that nobody cared about their technology before the
1980s. ... But a rapidly shifting business environment is forcing

that notion to change. William Keefauver, an AT&T vice
president and the company's top lawyer, cites three reasons: a
significant gain in the competitiveness of foreign nations, coupled
with an upsurge in counterfeiting; a higher proportion of a
vendor's added value found in software; and a radical ruling in
1982 that created the CAFC-a body that has consistently upheld
the value of patents.
Patents didn't count for much prior to that; as much as 70%
of all patents were found to be invalid when tested in court,
largely because the courts ruled in favor of dissemination of
technology. "During the 1960s and 1970s, the concern was over
monopolies. But that concern has largely disappeared," explains
Oliver Smoot, executive vice president of the Computer and
Business Equipment Manufacturers' Association.'"
The trump of property seems to require a determined ignorance of patent's
policy role, because under its view of patents as property,'47 no legitimate point

144. When the giant chemical firm, Gema, refused to supply Zenith with raw materials to
manufacture a drug that would have competed with Bristol-Meyers, an expert speculated that Gema did

so because its parent, Sandoz, did not want to offend its competitor and opponent in a patent
infringement suit, Bristol-Meyers. "Sandoz is a multibillion [dollar] drug company; somebody might
have said, 'Are you one of us or one of them?"' Robin Goldwyn Blumenthal, Zenith Labs Shares
Tumble by Almost 40%, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1991, at B4.
145. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor
PatentBounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (proposing a solution to the pervasive collusion throughout
the patent system).
146. Electronic Business Copyright (c) 1988 Information Access Company; Copyright (c)
Cahners Publishing Co. 1988; August 15, 1988.
147. See generally John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. REV.
569, 569 (2002) ("Patents have seldom troubled civil libertarians. A specialized form of property,
patents seemed pertinent to the technologies of traditional industry but little else."); Richard F. Cahaly,

HeinOnline -- 56 S. C. L. Rev. 375 2004-2005

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:337

exists at which to discuss policy. The argument over patents as property, thus, is
clearly a diversion. The real question should be not whether patents are property,
but, whatever their character, whether the public has the power and ability to
exercise its own rightful interest in them. The trump of property, almost by
definition, denies any interest outside that of the proprietor.' To call a patent a
property right in order to obscure the economic and political nature of the patent
regime is to use, as Justice Holmes said in a slightly different area of IP, "an
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences.... " Calling patents
property, and thus denying the political nature of the role government plays in
creating them or the public interest in policing them, fails to properly analyze the
patent bargain. In that bargain, the patentee gives certain information to the public
and receives temporary privileges in return. Nothing is inevitably or incurably
wrong with calling the temporary privileges property, but the concept is certainly
far removed from the general notion of property."0 The double-barreled nature of
the trump of property makes it effective and desirable to patent proprietors: the
theory merits absolute rights to ownership, but any discussion of its role as a form
of national industrial policy is simply off limits.
VI.

THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The characterization of patents as a form of property-which is inconsistent
with the preceding discussion of the process for granting patents-leads directly to
international abuses. On the deployment of the trump of property, views of patent
law once simply different become cases of piracy. 5' The trump of property forbids

Comment, At Each Other's Mercy: Do Courts Fairly Apply Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedureto Protect Patent Co-Owners' Property Rights?, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 685 (2001)
("Courts have stated that a patent constitutes property different from real or personal property, but,
nonetheless, still forms an independent property interest."). Professor Mark Lemley attributes a shift
in the rhetoric of IP to "propertization," that compels the public to believe, for instance, that
infringement is ."theft,' which it assuredly is not .. " Mark A. Lemly, Book Review, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric ofProperty,75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 897 (1997).
148. The Patent Act does not speak of, or grant, a partial interest or right to the proprietor, but
instead, recognizes an exclusive right. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). Moreover, the Act declares that
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property," a form of property in which the public
traditionally has few, if any, legitimate rights. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
149. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). Accord Franke
v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 502 n.6 (2d Cir. 1953) (quoting E. du Pont, 244 U.S. at 102).
150. The "new property" owes its birth to Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964), and its constitutional legitimacy to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970), which
affirmed the notion that government benefits trigger due process requirements and therefore have some
quality of property. Since that arrival, liberals have, probably justly, celebrated how the development
has helped secure demands of the less fortunate against the government. The trump of property,
however, surely turns all that on its head and seems like chickens coming home to roost with a
vengeance.
151. For an insightful explanation of the so-called IP piracy, see Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox
ofIntellectualPropertyLawmaking in the New Millennium: Universal Templates as Terms ofSurrender
for Non-IndustrialNations; Piracyas an Offshoot, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 70-71 (2002),
which states:
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discussion that each nation, as a form of national industrial and competition policy,
should have a strong interest and unarguable right to fashion its patent laws in any
way it sees fit. If patents are simply a form of government regulation of
competitive conditions"5 2 or, more broadly, a form of national industrial policy,
their wholesale export into other countries, especially less-developed ones, becomes
highly contestable. Nations with different economic conditions need not and
should not import and adopt the regulations that other countries impose, under the
rubric of nonobviousness, on their own investments. In other words, given an
understanding of the true nature of patent law-the test of nonobviousness or its
international equivalent, the "inventive step,""' conscientiously or rationally
demanding the imposition of First World patents upon Third World countries
becomes very difficult.'54
This dilemma becomes a decisive matter in an age of rapid international
expansion of IP rights. Domestic IP law is progressively extending across
international boundaries.'
The previously somewhat dry, abstract, and even
"intellectual" subject of copyrights, patents, and trademarks has become a matter

Most often, piracy is perceived to be a manifestation of paltry IP protection or
enforcement. Indeed, both are treated as being identical. Yet, while any nation's
decision whether or not to introduce its own laws must be a measure of its
sovereignty and its choice to adopt one specific form or another should be
considered legitimate, this perspective is disavowed by the current, if not
dominant, thinking among policy makers and academic lawyers in the U.S. and
Europe. Typically, the characterization of non-enforcement as "piracy" overlooks
the possibility, even reality, of the incongruity of IP to the degree of industrial
development in the "pirate nations."
152. "The operation of federal patent, copyright and trademark laws is assumed to advance the
federal competitive mandate." Goldstein, supra note 11, at 878. The second basic problem ["in the
economics of the patent system"] relates to the overall allocation of productive resources in a
developing economy, and to the question of whether at any one time the allocation to industrial research
and development is deficient, excessive, or just right. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 129, at 445.
153. TRIPS, supra note 20, at 1208 n.27.
154. For more on this issue, see generally, Davis, supra note 6, at 830 (discussing whether IP
would protect the cultural innovations of Third World countries).
155. Two notable recent additions to American domestic IP law illustrate well the attempt to
expand the exercise of IP ownership overseas in ways previously thought to be illegitimate, that is,
constrained by limitations of intraterritoriality. Congress has recently amended the patent law to allow
the treatment of foreign products produced under processes protected by domestic patents as if produced
domestically. Congress has taken this approach, because most countries consider acting as if domestic
patent law has extraterritorial effect, the precise effect of this law, to be illegitimate. The second area
is the growing reaction to the importation of "gray market" trademarked goods. Previously, the United
States allowed importation of goods legally obtained abroad as long as proper marketing (meaning the
affixation of any trademark) occurred in the country of origin. The current reaction excludes many of
these goods and gives domestic trademarks an extraterritorial dimension they have historically never
had. "As innovators create new technologies and problems for intellectual property law, domestic
legal systems will have to respond with new forms of protection. With the increasing importance of the
international marketplace, governments will need to extend this protection globally through one of the
international
intellectual property protection mechanisms."
Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and
InternationalIntellectualPropertyProtection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 465, 487-88 (1994).
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of international concern and even of popular culture.1"6 TRIPS157 allowed this new

15
kind of economic imperialism to gain legitimacy."
Internationally, patent law has developed into a means to exert raw power in
a way frighteningly reminiscent of nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy. "Patents
are important to 'show the flag'-to show that you're serious about protecting your
technology,"' 59 according to one industry report. "You have to build your arsenal
with a portfolio of quality patents so that you put yourself in a position to have that
'silver bullet' to block a competitor. The more patents you have, the more likely
it is that you'll get that silver bullet...."16 o Unsurprisingly, the assertion of such
raw power leads to abuse. 6' But, abuse can only occur within the trump of
property.
In the middle to late 1980s, patent holders engaged in a full-court press to
expand their reach into previously unreachable places. Allegations of piracy and
claims of patents as absolute property were recurrent themes. A "problem"
suddenly arose of international patent "counterfeiting and piracy"' 62 -a problem

156. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are no longer the reserve of specialists and are now truly
topical to all. Too many possible issues are present to cite here in every area of the media. Perhaps one
of the best known is the Napster case, A & MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001). See Kelly Alexander, The Day My Free Computer Music Died,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, § 9,

at 6.
157. See supra note 155.
158. See Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence ofFree Trade
Practice,GlobalEconomics and Their GoverningPrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC L. REV.

733 (2001).
159. John Kerr, Loose Lips Sink Chips, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, Sept. 15, 1988.

160. Id. (quoting Steven Fox, head of the intellectual property section of technology giant HewlettPackard's legal department). In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir.

1979), the court ordered a balancing of the interests ofthe United States against those of each of twenty-six
foreign countries to determine whether the foreign interest in providing patent protection to the defendant
exceeded the domestic interest in permitting competitive trade in the patented product by non-patent
holders. The court based its decision on considerations of "foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and
limitations of judicial power." See also Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal

Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (addressing the problem that the
issuance of a large number of questionable patents for software-related ideas may impede competitive
development and follow-on innovation in the software industry).
161. "It is conceivable that the holder of a patent for one good might not want to sell that good
if its sale could undercut the market position of [a] more profitable good that the firm sells." Gacek,
supra note 2. See also Jennifer J. Stearman, Recent Development: DiscoVision Associates v. Disc
Manufacturing, Inc.-Alleging Monopolization, Patent Tying, and Market Allocation in the Compact
Disc Technology Market: Surviving a Motion to Dismiss, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 89 (1997)

(discussing the allegations of abuse of the patent system, fraud, and misrepresentation in prosecuting
and obtaining patents and engaging in coercive package licensing practices in Disco Vision Assocs. v.
DiscMfg., Inc., Nos. 95-21-SLR, 95-345-SLR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1997));
Oddi (Obviousness), supra note 23, at 1105-06 (noting that by "the end of the nineteenth century,
significant anti-patent sentiment called for the non-adoption or abolishment of patent systems, because
they were anti-competitive, extracted high social costs, and enhanced the abuses of monopoly power").
162. Harvey J. Winter, The Role of the United States Government in Improving International
IntellectualPropertyProtection,2 J.L. &TECH. 325, 325 (1987). See also Trishka Waterbury, Updates
in Science & Technology Law-Biotechnology, 1 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 9, 17-18 (1995), which

recounts the following illustration of an international patent conflict:
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constituting no more than the historically-accepted fact that not all countries had,
nor should they have had under universally accepted principles of international law,
the same patent regime as the United States. While some respected commentators63
remained skeptical that non-uniform patent policies injured United States trade,
others insisted that "inadequate patent protection.., has a negative effect on U.S.
trade.""' Because this situation could "no longer be tolerated,"' 16 the United States
government increasingly issued the "threat of sanctions"' 66 against intransigent
foreign governments. In fact, the very existence of a different foreign patent regime
became a potentially "unfair trade practice" under United States law, 67 subjecting

Genentech has formally requested that U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
threaten trade sanctions against Japan for inadequately protecting and enforcing
U.S. biotechnology patents. Genentech's President and CEO, Kirk Raab, said that
one of the biggest problems American companies face upon entering the Japanese
market is "the denial of meaningful patent protection," along with "delays in
obtaining approval of products and in securing issued patents." Specifically, Raab
charged that Japan's patent policy allows Japanese biotechnology companies to
compete in the market "without incurring the heavy R&D costs carried by U.S.
firms."

id. at 16-17.
163. POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (3d ed.).
164. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-BasedPharmaceuticalCompanies:The Needfor Improved

PatentProtection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (1987) (speaking as lobbyist for the American
Pharmaceuticals industry). See also Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain
Diplomacy ofInternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 535 (1998),

who provides as follows:
The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy Negotiation ("ACTPN") provided the
forum for U.S. intellectual property interests to advocate a "trade-related" strategy
to reform the intellectual property policy milieu in which they were operating.
The ACTPN, led by the chief executive officers of Pfizer and IBM, persuaded the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") that the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations should be used to adapt the international institutions of intellectual
property to a world economy where developing countries were major producers
of intellectual property goods. Patent protection should be harmonized at a high
standard, and computer software, increasingly important to the U.S. economy,
should be explicitly protected by the Berne Convention. Business interests and
USTR articulated a "GATT strategy" to overcome developing-country opposition
within WIPO to intellectual property institution change. GATT had a record of
success regarding new rule creation in politically thorny trade policy matters, and
it was its institutional design which offered the prospect of successfully reforming
international intellectual property laws.
Id. at 559. Amy E. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global

Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2433, 2458 (1995) ("The United States and other
developed countries claim that WIPO does not do enough to promote more stringent IP systems among
its member states.").
165. Mossinghoff, supra note 164, at 309.
166. Id. at 310.
167. The statute authorizes sanctions against "those foreign countries that.., deny adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights," 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (2000), and further states
that "[a] foreign country may be determined to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific
obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ....

HeinOnline -- 56 S. C. L. Rev. 379 2004-2005

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56: 337

the foreign country to severe economic punishment unless it adopted laws of which
this nation approved, regardless of full compliance with TRIPS.1 6 1 In the 1980s,
numerous countries started to surrender to these offensives. Both Mexico and
Korea rewrote their IP laws at this country's demand.169 Those changes occurred
despite the fact that the governing international convention at that time, 170 in
contrast to American complaints, restated the accepted international law principal
to require only "equal treatment of nationals of all member countries in obtaining
a patent in each member country.""' More than two dozen countries at that time
refused to recognize patents for life-saving pharmaceuticals, a "problem" the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association had "targeted" for government
resolution. 77 A significant number of countries, including Portugal, Venezuela,
Egypt, and India, rejected the notion that any one firm or individual should
monopolize such chemicals, drugs, or foodstuffs, granted no such patent
monopolies to its citizens, and refused to recognize the same in foreigners.
Although these actions were in complete accord with the governing conventions
and international law, the dominant expansion of IP under the multinational
industrial view of patents as property, and the exclusion of debate over their true
regulatory role, seem to have carried the day.
Parenthetically, whether the failure to protect such innovations, or more
accurately, the demand that they are subject to free market forces, had any impact
upon innovation or invention remains unanswered to this day. 173 A respectable
§ 2242(d)(4). See also the new legal developments regarding TRIPS under TRIPS-plus that favor the
United States in its dealings with the developing countries.
Most provisions included in US bilateral treaties are TRIPs-equivalent,that is to
say literally duplicated from the TRIPs Agreement. Others, such as the definition
of the industrial application requirement, go beyond TRIPs provisions and can be
described as TRIPs-plus. These are mostly copied from US law-or even on US
Patent and Trademark Office policies not yet submitted to Congress-and
exported to trading partners.
Jean-Frederic Morin, The Futureof Patentabilityin InternationalLaw According to CAFTA, BRIDGES,
Mar. 2004, at 14, 16; see also Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement:
ProtectionofData Submittedfor the RegistrationofPharmaceuticals,3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 85 (2002)
("From a public health perspective, the introduction of TRIPS-plus standards does not seem to be the
best approach for developing countries."). For concrete examples of TRIPS-plus standards, see for
example, Javier Gamboa, TRIPs-Plus Standards in the Free Trade Agreement Signed Between Chile
andthe US, 54 INTELL. PROP. FORUM 109, 109 (2003) (briefly noting the lP standards in the US TRIPSplus agreement with Chile).
168. This law is still explicitly in effect. See id.
169. See Mossinghoff, supranote 164, at 310; Winter, supra note 162, at 331. See generallyOddi
(IPS), supra note 23, at 845 nn.68-69, 874 n.191 (discussing Congressional action against countries
with unapproved laws).
170. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 1, as
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1629 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
171. Le-Nhung McLeland & J. Herbert O'Toole, PatentSystems in Less Developed Countries:
The Cases of India and the Andean Pact Countries, 2 J.L. & TECH. 229, 230 (1987).
172. Mossinghoff, supra note 164, at 312, 323-24.
173. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special PatentProvisionsfor Pharmaceuticals:Have They Outlived
Their Usefulness?: A Political,Legislative and Legal History of US. Law and Observationsfor the
Future, 39 IDEA 389, 421 (1999). A very interesting situation is present in the domestic drug market.
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body of research asserts that any relationship between patent protection and new
products is a negative one.'74 Furthermore, such research indicates that the
imposition of United States-style patent protection results in a loss of domestic
research and development."' Extending patent protection to areas previously
subject to market forces is probably not in the interests of most foreign countries
(and perhaps even our own). 6 Consequently, although this country persists in
extending patent protection as far as imaginable, many other countries extend
necessary to satisfy TRIPS or even more extraordinary
protection only to the extent
77
demands.
States
United

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ... was an
unprecedented attempt to achieve two seemingly contradictory objectives,
namely, 1) to make lower-costing generic copies of approved drugs more widely
available and 2) to assure that there were adequate incentives to invest in the
development of new drugs.
• . . Specifically, it was proposed to create an exception to the Bolar
infringement exemption in those instances where an applicant for an ANDA
declared an intent to seek immediate FDA approval for marketing without regard
to the expiration date of a patent.
. . . The generic drug manufacturers received several benefits as an
inducement to accept these patent limitations, including assurances that 1) the
ANDA giving rise to the patent challenge would be preserved for approval upon
patent expiration even if the challenged patent was found to be valid and infringed
and 2) no damages could be awarded for infringement unless there were
commercial acts.
Unlike the situation which prevailed prior to 1984, patents are now
vigorously protected by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-a court
which was new and had essentially no track record in 1984; the generic drug
industry has become big business and has the financial ability to pay damages for
wrongful infringement, and, most importantly, fourteen years of patent litigation
experience has demonstrated that the generic side prevails far more often than the
patent owner when patent rights are asserted.
Id. at 389, 402, 403, 423.
Pablo Chalhi, The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, WORLD
174.
COMPETITION, Dec. 1991, 65, 115. See also Mark Ritchie et al., Intellectual Property Rights and
Biodiversity: The IndustrializationofNatural Resources and TraditionalKnowledge, 11 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 439 (1996) ("Imported patented products are generally more expensive and
negatively impact the trade balance in a developing country.").
175. PABLO M. CHALLU, PATENT MONOPOLY IN ITALY: CONSEQUENCES.
176. See Boyle, supra note 44, at 1454 (addressing "the hypothesis that the number of inventions
would increase along with the world-wide increase in patent systems," and concluding "that there is no
significant relationship between these two variables, either in the United States or in the world at
large"). See also Oddi (IPS), supra note 23, at 857 n. 114 (discussing the United States' attempts to
extend IP protection).
177. Milt Freudenheim, Drugs Cost Less in Canada Than in US.. Study Finds,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1992, at D-2 (reporting that a General Accounting Office study found average drug prices in Canada
32% less than in the United States). As a result, Canada was pressured to abandon its compulsory
pharmaceutical patent laws. The battle then shifted to the Third World where this country continues to
battle undeveloped countries over their efforts to make drugs affordable. Tina Rosenberg, Look at
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The United States tried, but failed, to resolve this perceived problem by seeking
to alter the Paris Convention' (the governing international patent treaty) to afford
greater patent protection for international businesses. The subsequent attempt to
accomplish the same result by altering GATT to include IP within the protections
of non-discrimination that applied solely to tangible goods sold across international
borders failed, for a substantial time, to gain international agreement.'7 9 In 1994,
however, the Uruguay Round of GATT adopted TRIPS."'0 In the process, the
developing countries may have sacrificed their interests to the profits of the First
World, for TRIPS mandates substantially the same patent laws, with the kind of
broad coverage theretofore found only in United States law, for all member
countries. '
Until TRIPS, terms like "piracy" and "counterfeiting" had no legitimate
application when a country refused to grant to foreigners or nationals the right to
monopolize what it considered basic human necessities and rights. In fact, piracy
and counterfeiting are appropriate terms only for the illegal practice of patents that
the host country issued. In other words, the commission of piracy or counterfeiting
is simply impossible where such an act does not violate a country's domestic IP
regime. To accuse a country of piracy or counterfeiting, absent a violation or even
toleration of a violation of domestic laws applicable to foreigners and nationals
alike, was to engage in diatribe, not dialogue. The World Trade Organization's
imposition of TRIPS upon all member countries now guarantees that these reluctant
recipients will indeed be pirates if they become complicit in the violation of those
laws, regardless of the coercion involved in their adoption.
In summary, the internationalization of patent law depends upon the trump of
property, fundamentally grounded in the uninformed view that patents are the
product of a determinate, impartial, corporal assessment of the technological state
of a particular innovation. The trump of property ignores the truth that patent law,
as discussed, imposes a political choice over preferred modes of investment. This
decision to treat patent law and determinations of inventorship as objective and
culturally independent is almost comic. Using the ordinary practitioner test with
all its parallels to the "reasonable person" of negligence law is as unquestionably
subjective in the sense of its uncertainty, indeterminacy, and contingency as is
negligence law. For instance, a hypothetical decision about negligence in New
York that allowing garbage to collect on the street for several days at a time is not
unreasonable involves calculations of the burdens, costs, and risks culturally and
economically specific to New York. Any attempt to transport that decision to
Singapore, Algiers, London, or Zurich would be laughable. To the extent the

Brazil, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 28, 2001, at 26. However, coming full circle since last
year, Canada and its drug policy are again in the news. See, e.g., Monica Davey, Illinois Seeks
Permission to Buy Drugs in Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at A12 (Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich sought to save the state "16 percent of its annual share of drug costs" for its employees).
178. Paris Convention, supra note 170.
179. See Sell, supra note 137.
180. TRIPS, supra note 153.
181. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 158.
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calculation of nonobviousness is, as the Supreme Court says, a reasonable person
model, a similar attempt to transport a decision about invention from one culture
or economic system to another is comical. One cannot insist that the same
calculation constitutes invention across all boundaries any more than one can insist
that what is negligence in one place is negligence in all.
This cultural-dependent nature of IP regimes is impossible to ignore. "[T]he
level of protection accorded to intellectual property by any country represents a
balance between a number of conflicting national considerations; thus, protection
is a function of a country's domestic situation and the various national policy
objectives-social, developmental, and technological-that intellectual property
laws are designed to serve." ' 2 To understand patent law, one must recognize that
this initial balancing of considerations changes constantly and finds a disguise in
the hidden interstices of the patent law. Yet, the apparently myopic position of the
United States and other industrialized countries often seems to be that the former
"pirate" nations were manipulating IP to further purportedly illegitimate social,
economic, or technological agendas, while our laws did nothing more than
recognize eminent and unassailable property rights. 83 Often ignored is the fact that
this country's IP law regime is as skewed as others-furthering our political goals,
supporting our economic values, and protecting our most valued industries. Yet,
under TRIPS, the United States gives precious little quarter to developing nations
seeking equivalent advantages. 84
The application of patent law internationally has become just one more way the
rich exploit the poor:
And yet when you consider how technologies exchange, when
you examine the list of restricted conditions in those exchanges,
it would be difficult to escape finding parallel to another era in
human history-the era of feudalism, under which land was

182. David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, IntellectualPropertyRights: The Issues in GATT,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 904 (1989).
183. One scholar observed:
Although many developing nations are among the worst pirates of patents and
other forms of intellectual property, they would prosper from a strong regime
protecting patents because these protections promote invention and
industriousness and because they promote closer commercial ties with foreigners
who will see their willingness to safeguard intellectual property as a sign of
commercial sophistication and trustworthiness.
Gacek, supra note 2.
184. A notable recommendation suggests the following:
The GATTl agreement should require a transition period of no more than two
years for countries to adopt adequate patent laws .. . . Of course, the least
developed countries should be allowed one or two years longer to adjust to the
technical demands of enforcing patent protection, such as the establishment and
maintenance of patent offices.
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owned by a handful of landowners and was leased to
sharecroppers and tenants-at-will.
185
Unsurprisingly, the expansion of IP in the United States, in other advanced
countries, and with TRIPS, internationally, has carried with it a distorted and
wrong-headed view of the nature of IP. Viewing patents as the equivalent of
tangible personal property, a belief that piracy can arise without illegality, reveals
pure ignorance of the law of intangibles, an ignorance rare in other areas of the law.
This shortcoming may exist because in no other area of law are the interested
parties so uniformly and hegemonically aligned behind a single, though singularly
inaccurate, misunderstanding.'86
Assertions of patent rights are not only claims of property ownership, but also
domestic political judgments about the quality of life a society values and, in the
case of a national industrial policy, the extent of investment. The United States'
attempt to label foreign values different from its own as criminal piracy is troubling.
A comparable situation would be Ohioans repulsed by champignons calling France
a nation of poisoners.'
GATT steered clear of any apparent problems while still
limited to physical goods, the property ownership of which countries around the
world universally recognize or at least avoid disputing. However, the application
of GATT principles to IP converts a system of shared values to one in which some
attempt to impose their particular domestic agendas upon others.
While the international trade controversy appears to involve both discreet
concepts of extraterritoriality and amorphous ideas of economic justice, its
significance increases substantially upon consideration of the decisive impact of
some extraordinarily hidden and obscure issues of domestic American patent law.
The cultural and political aspects of patent law are sometimes difficult to
understand, especially to Americans, for whom claims of property are so redolently
resonant. A comparative example illustrates the point. For most of this nation's
history, American patent law did not extend to surgical procedures as such. While
new drugs, tools, or equipment, even those used in surgery, could qualify for
protection as inventions, a new surgical procedure itself, without more, could not.
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit held that no such bar existed. In response,

185.

Surendra J. Patel, What the Group of 77 Wanted at UNCTAD and Why, in CURRENT

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

124, 127 (Walter R.'

Brookhart et al. eds., 1980).
186. A partial explanation is that, at least until the last few years, no anti-patent bar has organized
(such as one might find in products liability, for instance, where a substantial plaintiffs as well as
defendant's bars are active; or even in criminal law, where the adversaries debate even the most
fundamental assumptions of the system). Only the recent international expansion of IP into areas like
computers and the internet caused organized resistance to develop. Until then, small and relatively
powerless professional groups, like the librarians, have provided the only resistance to expanded IP

rights.
187. Another example, as one writer observed, involved the Chinese, astonished to find Americans
repelled by their regional canine cuisine, a cuisine unthreatened by Mad Cow Disease, asking, "But aren't
you afraid to eat beef these days?" Craig S. Smith, Local Treat Angers World PetLovers, N.Y. TIMES, July
7, 2001, at A4.
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Congress effectively reinstituted the bar to shield doctors and health-providing
institutions from the threat of damages for surgical patents.'
That medical procedures should not be one person's private property has a
rather appalling historical antecedent. An infamous pair of sixteenth century
physicians, the Chamberlain brothers, invented the obstetrical use of forceps, but
insisted on using them only behind curtains. They profited immensely in their
personal practice from the secret they thus maintained.'89 The deep feeling that this
kind of mischief is unacceptable explains our historical aversion to health patents,
despite the Federal Circuit's apparently contrary view.
Thus, one can consider our likely reaction to the Chinese or Canadians, for
instance, finding their intellectual forte in procedures rather than drugs and deciding
to extend their patent laws to purely surgical procedures. If such procedures
became patented, under Chinese or Canadian domestic patent law to protect a new
procedure whereby tissue from the muscle of the heel of the right foot replaces
failing hearts, would the United States feel compelled to recognize the patent? If
not, would citizens feel, every time such a transplant occurred, that they were
pirating the property of Chinese or Canadian researchers? Perhaps a more topical
inquiry would be whether to recognize other countries' claims to now patent human
genomes that the PTO has apparently rejected as unpatentable. Would Americans
admit, therefore, under German, French, or some other foreign law, to being pirates
for insisting that human genes be public domain?
A decision to protect certain kinds of intangibles seemingly proceeds from
political judgments about the good life. Thus, a decision to exclude some kinds of
intangibles from protection is not simply a matter of piracy but, to the contrary, an
affirmation that some knowledge belongs to all and, further, that allowing the
exclusion of such knowledge from the public would be immoral. America takes
that approach toward medical surgical procedures. Most of South America, and
several Asian countries, feel similarly about drugs. What they see as a moral
affirmation, the United States labels piracy.
The choices, however, are not solely cultural to the exclusion of economic. In
truth, choices to patent things such as surgical procedures or business methods may
vindicate cultural values, but they also constitute, far more importantly, economic

188. "With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that constitutes
an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of [other] sections... shall not
apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity." 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
189. A recent account of the story provides as follows:
The Chamberlen brothers ... traveled round England, charging enormous fees,
always payable in advance, for attending births. The forceps were concealed in
a richly carved locked casket. The brothers went to amazing lengths to prevent
information about their instrument from leaking out. Contrary to the custom of
the day, they excluded female family members from the delivery chamber; they
blindfolded the laboring woman; and to confound the anxious relatives still
further, they made all sorts of diversionary noises such as ringing loud bells,
rattling chains, and banging with hammers during the delivery.
JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH 25 (1992).
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decisions-whether investment in such an industry is worth the cost of private
property characterization. The national industrial policy, which patent law
represents, vindicates cultural values through that kind of economic calculus, thus
incorporating both sets of values. As Paul Samuelson has said in a different
context, "Profits are the lifeblood of the economic system, the magic elixir upon
which progress and all good things depend ultimately. But one man's lifeblood is
another man's cancer."' 190
VII. CONCLUSION

A full understanding of patent law reveals its essentially political nature.
Calling patents ordinary property, and, more importantly, treating those rights as
such seems slightly irrational. Does the characterization matter? Failure to
understand that patent law plays an active role in fashioning a national industrial
policy, or ignorance of the sheer presence of such a policy, leaves the country and
its economy at the mercy of that policy. Internationally, the United States is likely
to commit equal or worse damage. Surely, a country dedicated to universal values
(not just the short term expedience of profit at any cost) has a defining interest in
the welfare of others. This nation cannot be the new Barbarians of the twenty-first
century, plundering the world for its own exclusive benefit. More particularly,
America cannot afford to set the precedent that only self-interest matters. For when
the wheel turns-and no one of any wisdom can doubt that it surely will
turn-America will have no place to hide and no principle upon which to defend
even its own interests when they are no longer paramount to those of others.

190. D.B. Tinnin, Profits: How Much is Too Little?, TIME, Aug. 16, 1976, at 54-55.
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